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In this thesis, we consider a distributed mechanism to detect and to 
defend against the low-rate TCP attack. The low-rate TCP attack is 
a recently discovered attack. In essence, it is a periodic short burst 
that exploits the homogeneity of the minimum retransmission time-
out (RTO) of TCP flows and forces all affected TCP flows to backoff 
and enter the retransmission timeout state. When these affected TCP 
flows timeout and retransmit their packets, the low-rate attack will 
again send a short burst to force these affected TCP flows to enter 
RTO again. Therefore these affected TCP flows may be entitled to 
zero or very low transmission bandwidth. This sort of attack is diffi-
cult to identify due to a large family of attack patterns. We propose 
a distributed detection mechanism to identify the low-rate attack. 
In particular, we use the “dynamic time warping'' approach to ro-
bustly and accurately identify the existence of the low-rate attack. 
Once the attack is detected, we use a fair resource allocation mecha-
nism to schedule all packets so that (1) the number of affected TCP 
flow is minimized and, (2) provide sufficient resource protection to 
those affected TCP flows. We also develop a fluid model which is 
analyzed and proved to be precise to describe the behavior of TCP 
flows under the fair resource allocation mechanism. Experiments are 
carried out to quantify the robustness and accuracy of the proposed 
i 
distributed detection mechanism. In particular, one can achieve a 
very low false positive/negative when compare to legitimate Inter-
net traffic. Our experiments illustrate the efficiency of the defense 















整算法（Dynamic Time Warping, DTW)，可以可靠而準確地檢測該低頻攻擊。 
一旦發現低頻攻擊，我們使用一种公平的網絡資源分配機制，使（1)受低頻攻 
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This chapter provides a general introduction about the con-
tent focused in this thesis.  
The TCP protocol provides the reliable data delivery and simpli-
fies application design and is being used in many network applica-
tions including file transfers, e-commerce, and web HTTP access. In 
general, designing a reliable protocol for many heterogeneous users 
sharing an unreliable network is challenging since it involves many 
subtle issues. For example, under severe network congestion, TCP 
requires sources to reduce their congestion window to one packet 
and wait for a retransmission timeout (RTO) before attempting to 
resend any packet. If there is further packet loss, the RTO is dou-
bled after each subsequent loss. The purpose of using the RTO is 
to ensure that TCP sources will give the network sufficient time to 
recover from a network congestion event. In [8], authors recom-
mend a lower bound of one second for its value in order to achieve 
near-optimal network throughput. 
Although the use of RTO in the TCP protocol stack can reduce 
and relieve the event of network congestion, this feature can also 
be exploited by a malicious user to crate a denial-of-service attack. 
1 
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Recently, authors in [30] present a form of low-rate TCP attack, 
in which an attacker periodically sends attack traffic to overflow a 
router's queue and cause packet loss. Due to the packet loss event, a 
legitimate (or well behaved) TCP source will then back off to re-
cover from the congestion and retransmit only after one RTO. If 
the attacker congests the router again at the times of the TCP's re-
transmission, then little or no real data packet can get through the 
router. Hence, by synchronizing the attack period to the RTO dura-
tion, the attacker can essentially shut off most, if not all, legitimate 
TCP sources even though the average bandwidth of the attack traffic 
can be quite low. The form of low-rate attack raises serious con-
cern because it is significantly more difficult to detect than more 
traditional brute force, flooding based DDoS attacks. Existing rate-
limiting approaches'[38,66], for example, are designed to control 
aggressive or flooding-based attackers only. 
In this thesis, we propose a distributed mechanism to detect against 
such low-rate TCP attacks. Because TCP is widely implemented and 
deployed, a proposal which requires changes to existing TCP proto-
col stack will incur a widespread modification of users' software 
and therefore this type of proposal may not be practical. This mo-
tivates us to consider a solution approach that can be implemented 
in a resilient routing infrastructure and benefit a large community of 
legitimate TCP users. 
For detecting the low-rate attack, because an attacker's primary 
objective is to ensure the periodic overflow of a router's buffer, a ba-
sic signature of an attack traffic will then be intermittent short bursts 
of high rate traffic in between periods of little or no activity (char-
acterized by, say, a periodic square wave). In practice, however, 
attack traffic can deviate from this basic attack signature for various 
reasons: distortion caused by queueing in intermediate routers, ag-
gregation with background traffic (e.g., UDP traffic), an attacker's 
own attempt to inject "noise" into its traffic to escape detection, 
etc. Moreover, in a distributed attack, the traffic from individual at-
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tack sources may not have the expected traffic characteristics, but 
the aggregation of such attack traffic does. Therefore, it is essential 
to develop detection algorithms that are both robust to traffic distor-
tions and at the same time, computationally efficient to execute. 
Once a low-rate attack has been detected, we seek to neutralize 
the effects of the attack traffic and minimize damage to legitimate 
users. The strategy is to rate limit and preferentially drop packets in 
an attack burst in order to reduce the loss of good user traffic. Note 
that the defense method has to provide a near perfect isolation in 
the midst of low-rate attack and at the same time, has to have the 
property of low implementation cost. 
The contribution of our work is: 
• Provide a formal model to describe and to generate a large fam-
ily of low-rate attack traffic. 
• Provide a distributed detection mechanism which uses the ''dy-
namic time warping “ (DTW) approach to robustly and effi-
ciently identify low-rate attack. We will show that the proposed 
detection mechanism has a very low false positive/negative, 
when comparing a low-rate attack with a legitimate traffic. 
• Provide a computationally efficient defense method to isolate 
legitimate traffic from the ill-behaved low-rate attack. 
• Develop a fluid model which is analyzed and proved to be pre-
cise to describe the behavior of TCP flows under the defense 
mechanism. 
The outline of this thesis is as follows. Background knowledge 
and related work is given in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3，we provide a 
formal mathematical model to describe and generate a large family 
of low-rate attack. In Chapter 4, we present the distributed mecha-
nism of detecting the existence of the low-rate TCP attack. We also 
show the robustness and accuracy of the propose detection method 
when comparing an attack traffic with legitimate Internet traffic. In 
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Chapter 5, we present the defense mechanism and its properties. The 
fluid model of TCP flows under the defense mechanism is proposed 
in Chapter 6. Simulations of the model are also provided and results 
are analyzed. Experiments are presented in Chapter 7 to illustrate 
the effectiveness of the defense scheme and Chapter 8 concludes. 
口 End of chapter. 
Chapter 2 
Background Study and Related 
Work 
Summary 
In this chapter, we provided the background knowledge 
about the Denial of Service Attack. We presented a classifi-
cation of all the DoS/DDoS attacks as well as the different 
countermeasures to each kind of attack.  
Network denial of service is a well recognized problem of im-
portance and urgency (e.g., [21,43]). In a simple Denial of Service 
Attack (DoS), a malicious user exploits the connectivity of the In-
ternet to cripple the service offered by a victim site, sometimes by 
flooding the victim with many requests, sometimes by more tricky 
techniques. Such kind of attacks can also originate from multiple 
hosts, which is called Distributed Denial of Service attacks (DDoS). 
Denial of service attacks caused significant damage to the Inter-
net each year. In February of 2000, several high-visibility Internet 
e-commerce sites including Yahoo [51] and Amazon were brought 
down by a series of massive DoS attacks. And in January of 2001, 
Microsoft's name server was disabled by a similar assault. Next, in 
October 2002，8 out of the 13 DNS root servers were incapacitated.... 
Many other sites have also been victims, ranging from smaller com-
5 
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mercial sites, to educational institutions and government organiza-
tions. Moore et al had provided insight into the prevalence of DoS 
activity on the Internet [40]. He used backscatter analysis and de-
tected over 12,000 attacks against over 5000 targets during a period 
of three weeks. 
Nowadays, DoS attack can be launched in many different ways, 
and some new kinds of Denial of Service attacks appeared as time 
went by. Research on denial of service attacks is primarily focused 
on attack detection and defense mechanisms. In this chapter we will 
review several the most important kinds of DoS attacks as well as 
some possible response mechanisms (As shown in Figure 2.1). 
Dos A t t a c k ^ 
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Figure 2.1: DoS Attacks and Countermeasures Classification. 
2.1 Victim Exhaustion DoS/DDoS Attacks 
One if the most common DoS attack is victim exhaustion attack, 
which purports to deny a victim providing or receiving normal ser-
vice by over consuming the resources of victim (bandwidth, buffer...). 
In a successful attack, large volume of traffic or packets are involved. 
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Usually, two ways to launch such DoS attacks: one is direct attacks, 
the other is reflector attacks. 
2.1.1 Direct DoS/DDoS Attacks 
In a direct attack, an attacker arranges to send out a large number of 
attack packets directly towards a victim (Shown in Figure 2.2). 
Agents 
w w m 
Agents 
Figure 2.2: Direct DoS Attacks. 
Usually, such attack is launched from multiple sources. An at-
tacker first set up a DDoS attack network, consisting of one or more 
attacking hosts, a number of masters and a large number of agents 
(also called slaves or zombies). The attacking host is actually a com-
promised machine controlled by the real attacker to scan for vulner-
able hosts and to implant attack master and slave programs, such as 
Trinoo [16], Tribe Flood Network 2000 [58] and Stacheldraht [12]. 
Each attacking host controls one or more masters, and each master in 
turn is connected to a group of slaves. With an attack network ready, 
the attacking hosts may launch a DDoS attack by issuing an attack 
command with the victim's address, attack duration, attack methods 
and other instructions to the masters; Each master, upon receiving 
the instructions, then pass the commands to its slaves for execution. 
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A detail process of building the attack network and launching attack 
is described in [17]. 
In a direct attack, attack packet can be TCP, UDP, ICMP, or a mix-
ture of them. In the TCP case, one of the most commonly used meth-
ods is SYN Flood [1], in which a large number of TCP SYN pack-
ets are sent to the victim. By setting up more and more half-open 
connections, all the memories are consumed for the pending con-
nections, thus preventing the victim from accepting new requests. 
Another type of TCP-base attack is to congest a victim's incoming 
link. In the UDP case, DoS attack can be launched between two 
UDP services [2]. And ICMP packets may also be used to achieve 
the same result. In this case, the victim usually responds with the 
corresponding ICMP reply and error messages. 
2.1.2 Reflector DoS/DDoS Attacks 
A reflector attack is a kind of indirect attack, in which intermedi-
ary nodes, known as reflectors, are used to launch the attack. The 
intermediary nodes can be servers and routers. As shown in Figure 
2.3, an attacker sends packets which require response to the reflec-
tor with the source address forged to be a victim's address. Without 
realizing the spoofed address, the reflector returns response packet 
according to the type of attack packet. If the number of reflectors is 
large enough, the victim's link will be flooded and get congested. 
As shown in Figure 2.3, the attack architecture to launch reflector 
attack is similar to the direct attack except that there are reflectors 
between the victim and agents. A reflector attack requires a set of 
predetermined reflectors, including DNS servers, HTTP servers, and 
even routers. Advantage of the reflector attack is that, the attacker 
does not need to implant attack agent to launch such kind of attack. 
More importantly, the reflected packets are in fact normal packets 
with legitimated address and packet types which is not easy to be 
filtered. 
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Reflectors 
Aoenlsjgy 
Figure 2.3: Reflector DoS Attacks. 
Smurf [3] is a well-known reflector DoS attack which using a 
forged ICMP Echo Request packet. The attacking packets are forged 
to set source address by targeting victim's address and sent to a 
subnet-directed broadcast address. After receiving a redirected ICMP 
Echo Request, each machine within the subnet will send ICMP Echo 
reply to the victim. Thus the victim is overwhelmed. Since reflec-
tor attacks are based on the reflectors' ability to generating traffic, 
any protocol supports this response requirement can be exploited to 
launch reflector attack. Thus TCP and UDP packet can also be used 
within a reflector DoS attack [52]. 
2.1.3 Spoofed Packet Filtering 
To defend these victim exhaustion kinds of DoS/DDoS attacks, one 
of the most intuitive and effective countermeasures is packet fil-
tering. First, the DoS/DDoS attack or attack packet is identified, 
and then the filtering mechanism classifies those packets and drops 
them. The overall performance of this detect-and-filter mechanism 
depends on the effectiveness of both phrases. As described in Fig-
ure 2.4, the detect-and-filter approach can be performed in different 
places between the victim and the agents or reflectors. 
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Figure 2.4: Spoofed Packet Filtering. 
Filtering the Attack Traffic at the Source 
Although it 
is difficult to detect DoS/DDoS attack at the source net-
works, it is quite effective to filter the packets as well as other illegit-
imate packets close to the source. A ubiquitous deployment of the 
ingress filtering [19] can drop all packets sent in direct attacks and all 
packets sent from agents to reflectors, if all the attack packets adopt 
randomly spoofed address. The ingress filtering mechanism does 
not allow outgoing packets with invalid IP address prefix. Thus, it 
will prohibit an attacker within the originating network form launch-
ing an attack using forged source addresses that do not conform to 
ingress filtering rule. An additional advantage of this type filtering 
is that it enables the originator to be easily traced to its true source, 
since the attacker would have to use a valid and legitimately reach-
able source address. Although it is easy for ISP to implement such 
type of filtering, it requires widely deployment to be effective against 
DDoS attacks. And this filtering mechanism actually does nothing 
to protect against flooding attacks which originate from valid pre-
fixes (IP address), or even attacks using a forged source address 
of another host within the permitted prefix filter range. Also Mo-
bile IP [49] will be specially affected by this ingress filtering. The 
"reverse tunnels" [40] need to be adopted to accommodate ingress 
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filtering for mobile IP. 
Another solution proposed by J.Mirkovic is call D-WARD [25]. 
It is deployed at the source-end networks (stub networks or ISP net-
works) and prevents the hosts from participating in DDoS attacks. 
D-WARD is configured with a set of address whose outgoing traffic 
should be policed, and monitors two-way traffic between the police 
address set and the rest of the Internet. Traffic statistics are main-
tained per flow and per connection for each type of traffic. Statistical 
analysis is performed to detect malicious activity. Suspicious flows 
are rate limited. 
W ^ - — ^ ； ； 罵 巧 翠 〜 广 
_ CM脈C4腿 D-WARD 卜•譬&C/i?C£ 每雙二姿 
Figure 2.5: D-WARD Architecture. 
As shown in Figure 2.5, D-WARD is a feedback system which 
consists of observation and throttling component. The observation 
component monitors all packets passing through the source router, 
gathers statistics on two-way traffic and detects the possible attacks. 
Periodically, statistics are compared to models of normal traffic and 
results are passed to the throttling component, which adjusts the rate 
limit of the source router. The imposed rate limits modifies the as-
sociate traffic flows and thus affect future observations. Since D-
WARD is deployed close to the source of attack, it can effectively 
mitigate the damage. The attack flow can be filtered before they 
enter the Internet core 
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Filtering the Attack Traffic inside the Network 
Ingress Filtering is to perform address validation at the source, and 
actually due to the wide deployment cost, it is far from enough 
to prevent all possible DDoS attack. Research has shown that un-
less ingress filtering is deployed almost everywhere, nearly arbitrary 
forgery is still possible [46]. Thus providing a solution to perform 
similar kind validation within the core network can greatly help net-
work security, arrack tracing and network problem debugging. How-
ever, due to the asymmetries in today's Internet routing [47], routers 
do not have readily available information to verify the correctness of 
the source address for each incoming packet. 
Jun Li et at provided a new protocol to force all IP packets to 
carry correct source address: Source Address Validity Enforce-
ment Protocol (SAVE) [34]. SAVE runs on individual routers and 
build a table at each router that specifies the valid incoming interface 
for packets carrying a given source address. Routers use this table 
to filter those packets with forged source address. 
SAVE assumes that each router is associated with a set of source 
addresses. All packets from this address space can only reach some 
set of destinations via this router. For each entry in its forwarding 
table, a SAVE router periodically generates SAVE updates directed 
toward the corresponding destination address space. Forwarding ta-
ble changes will also trigger new SAVE updates. In both cases, an 
update specifies the originating source address space and carries the 
destination address space. Since SAVE updates arrive on the same 
incoming interface as valid IP packets, routers between the source 
and final destination can record the legitimate incoming interface for 
the specified source address space. 
Filtering the Attack Traffic at the Destination 
Due to the aggregation of attack traffic, it is relatively easy to de-
tect the DoS/DDoS attack at the destination (victim's network). The 
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most difficult task is to differentiate between legitimate traffic and 
attack traffic, especially in case of highly distributed DDoS attacks. 
Tao Peng et al proposed a protection scheme using History-based 
IP Filtering (HIF) [48]. It is observed that most IP addresses of le-
gitimate packets to a given network take a small set of values, repre-
senting regular users, while the attack packets which contain a false 
source address, are usually randomly generated [26]. As a result, it 
is effective to differentiate legitimate packets from malicious pack-
ets based on the history of previous successful connections. In the 
HIF scheme, the edge router keeps a history of all the legitimate IP 
addresses which have previously appeared in the network. When 
the edge router is overloaded, this pre-built IP address database is 
used to admit the incoming packets. This mechanism will work in 
most of the cases. However, if the attack is launched without forging 
the IP address or forging the address to a group of real hosts which 
have successful connected to the victim before, false negative will 
be quite high when filtering the attack packets. 
2.1.4 IP Traceback 
Attack source traceback and identification is usually an after-the-
fact response to a DDoS attack. IP traceback refers to the problem, 
as well as the solution, of identifying the actual source information 
in the packet. Since during the DoS attack, especially the DDoS 
attack, information of the attack packets are usually spoofed, one 
need to identify the true originators of attack packets by constructing 
the attack path or attack tree. By doing effective IP traceback to the 
attack sources, system administrator can isolate or shut the attack 
facility down and meanwhile hold attackers accountable. 
To evaluate the effectiveness of an IP Traceback Scheme, sev-
eral features need to be considered. Accuracy is the most impor-
tant. Scheme should provide accurate information about routers near 
the attack sources rather than those near the victim. A scheme also 
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should be immune to attacker's misleading, recognizing and exclud-
ing the false information injected by the attacker. False Positive 
Rate (FPR) and False Negative Rate (FNR) are the metrics used 
to quantitatively measure the effectiveness of traceback scheme. The 
FPR is given by the rate of wrongly identifying source that did not 
actually emit attack packet. And the FNR is given by the rate of fail-
ing to identify an attack source. Also, an effective traceback scheme 
should not bring large overhead to the system (router or host). It 
should avoid using a large amount of packets to construct the attack 
path or attack tree. If packet information is to be maintained at the 
intermediate routers then collecting this information must be effi-
cient. Low processing and storage overhead are also necessary at 
the intermediate routers. 
Up till now, many kinds of IP traceback schemes have been pro-
posed like [22, 31, 58, 59, 64], which are mainly belongs to three 
categories: sampling based, logging based and traffic engineering 
based as shown in Figure 2.6. 
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Figure 2.6: IP Traceback. 
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Sampling based IP Traceback Schemes 
The simplest algorithm is Node Append which is to append each 
node's address to the end of the packet as it travels through the net-
work from attacker to victim. The attack path can be constructed on 
the sequence of routers embedded in any of the attack packets. The 
node append algorithm is both robust and extremely quick to con-
verge, since only one packet is required to obtain the list of routers. 
However, the disadvantages are the large overhead at routers and 
significant increase of packet size. 
To reduce both the router overhead and the per-packet space re-
quirement, some kinds of Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM) 
schemes have been proposed [53]. For the PPM Node Sampling 
scheme, the path is sampled one node at a time. Router marks each 
packet with probability p. Thus the probability of receiving a marked 
packet from a router d hops away is p(l - p广—i. As a result, the or-
der of the routers on the attack path can be deduced from the relative 
number of marked packets per router. Compared with Node Append, 
PPM Node Sampling has a much lower processing overhead at the 
router and lower packet overhead for each marked packet (Only one 
IP address is recorded.) on the other hand, using PPM Node Sam-
pling, it is difficult to distinguish multiple attackers since routers at 
the same distance will give the same percentage of marked packets. 
And huge number of packets are needed to construct the attack path 
which can not respond fast enough under the attack. 
A straightforward solution to the problems of PPM Node Sam-
pling is to explicitly encode edges in the attack path rather than sim-
ply individual nodes: PPM Edge Sampling. Three pieces of infor-
mation need to be recorded in each packet. The start and end router 
of each link and the distance of the edge sample from the victim. 
In a router with PPM Node Sampling Scheme, if router decides to 
mark a packet, it will write its own address in start field and zero 
in distance field. Otherwise, it will write address to the end field if 
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the distance is zero which means the packet has just been marked 
by the direct up stream router. Also, if decide not to mark a packet, 
it will increase the distance value in the distance field. During the 
attack, the attack path can be constructed according the following 
algorithm: 
Edge Sampling Path Reconstruction Algorithm: 
Let G be a tree with root v. 
Let edges in G be tuples (start, end, distance) 
1. For each packet w from attacker 
2. if {w.distance) == 0 then 
3. insert edge (w.start, v, 0) into G 
4. else 
5. insert edge (w. start, w.end, w.distance) into G 
6. Remove any edge (x, y, d) with d + distance from xiovmG 
7. Extract path {Ri..Rj) by enumerating acyclic paths in G 
Like Node Sampling, the router overhead of Edge Sampling is 
not large. And multiple attackers can be traced by this scheme. But 
additional packet space (72bits) is still a requirement. Some im-
proved schemes are proposed to reduce the space requirement which 
encodes edge information in the 16 bit of IP header identification 
field. However, problems are also caused by the encoding process. 
Encoding requires more packets to process and when packet is frag-
mented, marking becomes impossible. 
Similar to the Probabilistic Packet Marking Scheme is an ICMP 
Traceback scheme provided by Bellovin [9], in which routers gen-
erate ICMP packets to the destination with a low probability. For a 
significant traffic flow, the destination can gradually reconstruct the 
route that was taken by the packets in the flow. This scheme does 
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not need to write any information in the packets. But it will increase 
the network traffic. Also, ICMP packets may get discarded by some 
routers. 
Logging based IP Traceback Schemes 
Another important traceback scheme is to log packets at various 
points throughout the network and then use appropriate extraction 
techniques to discover the packets path through the network. Log-
ging requires no computation on the routers fast path and, thus, 
can be implemented efficiently in todays router architecture. How-
ever, since attack packet may be transformed as it moves through 
the network, attack path reconstruction is difficult. And memory 
requirements are prohibitive at high line speeds which makes full 
packet storage problematic. Additionally, traffic repositories may 
aid eavesdroppers, making extensive packet logs a privacy risk. 
To come over the challenges of logging based IP tracebace schemes, 
Snoeren et al proposed a Hash-Based IP Traceback Scheme [57" 
that generates audit trails for traffic within the network, and can trace 
the origin of a single IP packet delivered by the network in the recent 
past. The Hash-Based IP Traceback Scheme which is actually called 
Source Path Isolation Engine (SPIE) use a Bloom filter to reduce the 
memory requirement for logging (down to 0.5% of link bandwidth 
per unit time). By storing only packet digests, and not the packets 
themselves, SPIE also does not increase a networks vulnerability to 
eavesdropping. SPIE therefore allows routers to efficiently deter-
mine if they forwarded a particular packet within a specified time 
interval while maintaining the privacy of unrelated traffic. 
Figure 2.7 shows the three major architectural components of the 
SPIE system. Each SPIE-enhanced router has a Data Generation 
Agent (DGA) associated with it. The DGA produces packet di-
gests of each packet as it departs the router, and stores the digests 
in bit-mapped digest tables. The digest tables are stored locally at 
the DGA for some period of time, depending on the resource con-
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Figure 2.7: SPIE Architecture. 
straints of the router. If interest is expressed in the traffic data for 
a particular time interval, the tables are transferred to a SPIE Col-
lection and Reduction (SCAR) agent for longer-term storage and 
analysis. SCARs are responsible for a particular region of the net-
work, serving as data concentration points for several routers. They 
collect digest information from DGAs and build local attack graph. 
The attack graphs from each SCAR are grafted together to form a 
complete attack graph by the SPIE Traceback Manager (STM). The 
STM controls the whole SPIE system. When a traceback request 
is presented to the STM, it verifies the authenticity of the request, 
dispatches the request to the appropriate SCARs, gathers the result-
ing attack graphs, and assembles them into a complete attack graph. 
Upon completion of the traceback process, STMs reply to intrusion 
detection systems with the final attack graph. 
Note that DGA computes digests over the invariant portion of the 
IP header and the first 8 bytes of the payload. Frequently modified 
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header fields including TTL, TOS, checksum and certain IP options 
fields are masked prior to the digesting. 
Traffic Engineering based IP Traceback Schemes 
Burch and Cheswick have developed a traffic engineering based IP 
traceback schemes that does not require any support from network 
operators [11]. We call this technique Link-Loading Traceback 
or controlled flooding because it tests links by flooding them with 
large bursts of traffic and observing how this perturbs traffic from 
the attacker. Using a pre-generated map of Internet topology, the 
victim coerces selected hosts along the upstream route into itera-
tively flooding each incoming link on the router closest to the victim. 
Since router buffers are shared, packets travelling across the loaded 
link C including any sent by the attacker C have an increased proba-
bility of being dropped. By observing changes in the rate of packets 
received from the attacker, the victim can therefore infer which link 
they arrived from. As with other link testing schemes, the basic pro-
cedure is then applied recursively on the next upstream router until 
the source is reached. 
Although this scheme is simple and easy to implement, it has 
many drawbacks. The most problematic weakness is that Link-
Loading is itself a denial-of-service attack C exploiting vulnera-
bilities in unsuspecting hosts to achieve its ends. This drawback 
alone makes it unsuitable for routine use. Also it is poorly suited for 
tracing distributed denial-of-service attacks, because the link-testing 
mechanism is inherently noisy and it can be difficult to discern the 
set of paths being exploited when multiple upstream links are con-
tributing to the attack. Finally, this scheme requires being done dur-
ing the attack and cannot be used after the attack. 
Stone have also developed another traffic engineering based IP 
traceback schemes called CenterTrack [61]. The CenterTrack is 
an overlay network which consists of edge routers and one or more 
trace routers using IP tunnels. The overlay network is used to selec-
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tively reroute the "interesting" packets directly from edge routers to 
special tracking routers. Hop-by-hop tracking is then adopted, start-
ing with the tracking router closest to the victim. Input debugging 
is performed on the router of each hop, thus packets are examined, 
then dropped or forwarded to appropriate egress point. Note that 
BGP is used for routing updates between the tracing network and 
the backbone network. 
The tracing capability of CenterTrack only depend on edge routers 
and special purpose tracking routers, thus the number of routers re-
quired to perform tracking is reduced. However, similar to Link-
Loading Scheme, traceback process of CeterTtrack must be accom-
plished during attack period which imposes a strict timing constrains 
on the administrators. And when attacks originate from the back-
bone network itself but not edge routers, CenterTrack is not able to 
track these attacks. Also packet rerouting overhead at edge routers 
can not be ignored. 
2.1.5 Location Hiding 
Mechanisms to defend against DoS attack can be divided into reac-
tive approaches and proactive approaches. Most Filtering approaches 
and IP Traceback belong to the former approaches. Since all of them 
will wait for an attack to be launched before taking appropriate mea-
sures to protect the network. A proactive approach will eliminate 
all possibility of becoming a target by aggressively blocking all in-
coming packets whose source addresses are not approved. Some-
times the reactive approaches may not be very effective since reac-
tive methods that filter traffic by looking for known attack patterns 
or statistical anomalies in traffic patterns can be defeated by chang-
ing the attack pattern and masking the anomalies that are sought by 
the filter. 
A. Keromytis et al proposed a kind of proactive defense mech-
anism called Secure Overlay Services (SOS) [28]. They use a 
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combination of secure overlay tunneling, routing to construct the 
SOS architecture via consistent hashing and filtering. The goal of 
SOS architecture is to allow communication between a confirmed 
user and a target while hiding the target to unauthorized users. It 
is assumed that the set of nodes that participate in the overlay is 
known to the public and to the attacker as well. In a SOS network, 
a large number of proxies are created. The target selects a small 
subset of proxies as secret forwarders. The filter at the target only 
allows packets whose source address matches the address of secret 
forwarders to pass through. As a result, shown in Figure 2.8, if a 
host contacts any proxy, its legitimacy will be checked first. Then 
proxy randomly routes packet to another proxy. If destination proxy 
is secret forwarder, packet forwarded to target, otherwise packet ran-
domly routed to another proxy. Thus, with filters, multiple proxies, 
and secret forwarder(s), attacker cannot focus the attack. 
SOS can prevent the DoS attack in a proactive manner, however 
large number of hosts need to be involved to create the overlay. The 
deployment cost will be high. Also, it takes relatively a longer time 
for normal user to access the target due to the overlay routing. It is 
a trade off between the security and timely delivery. 
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2.2 QoS Based DoS Attacks 
2.2.1 Introduction to the QoS Based DoS Attacks 
To provide real-time communication services to multimedia appli-
cations or subscribed-based Internet users, the proposed network 
QoS (Quality of Service) infrastructure like Diff-Serv (Differenti-
ated Service) [10] reserves network resources for real-time traffic. 
Within the network QoS architecture, however, the reserved net-
work resource is susceptible to resource theft and abuse. Without a 
resource access control mechanism that can efficiently differentiate 
legitimate real-time traffic from attacking packets, the traffic condi-
tioning and policing enforced at ISP (Internet Service Provider) edge 
routers cannot protect the reserved network resource from embezzle-
ment. Such kind of attacks, targeting at reserved network resources 
and violating network QoS guarantees, can be called Quality of Ser-
vice based DoS Attacks or Denial of Quality of Service (DQoS) 
Attacks. 
Basically, there are two distinct kinds of QoS-based DoS attacks: 
The first class is control flow attacks, e.g., killer reservation in Re-
source Reservation Protocol (RSVP) [68]，which directly attack the 
signaling/control protocol in the control plane for network resource 
reservation and connection setup. In the absence of authorization, a 
user may request and reserve any amount of resources. Additionally, 
a user may forge, delete, or illegally modify a reservation messages. 
Another kind of QoS-based DoS attack is data flow attack (e.g., 
resource theft in the data plane), in which bogus data packets grab 
the reserved bandwidth from the owners or genuine real-time data 
flows. 
2.2.2 Countermeasures to the QoS Based DoS Attacks 
For the QoS Based DoS Attacks to the control flow, a secure com-
munication tunnel is necessary for the control flow. ARQoS Project 
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from North Carolina State University [4] and Authenticated QoS 
Project from University of Michigan [5] are provided. They pro-
posed a secure RSVP, in which resources are reserved online using 
strong authentication, and subsequently, compliance with the reser-
vation request parameters is verified. 
For the QoS Based DoS Attacks to the data flow, the overhead 
in data transmission for such kind of heavy-weighted authentication 
can not be negligible. Since latency caused by authentication may 
violate the delay requirements for delivering real-time data streams. 
Haining Wang et al proposed a fast and light-weighted IP network 
edge resources access control mechanism, called IP Easy-pass , to 
prevent unauthorized access to reserved network resources at edge 
network. A unique pass is generated and attached to each legitimate 
real-time packet so that an ISP edge router can validate the legiti-
macy of an incoming packet very quickly and simply by checking its 
pass. Generation of pass is done at the sending host. A sequence of 
passes are generated according to a priori agreed upon rules between 
the sending host and the ISP edge router. The passes are encrypted 
using RC-5 because it is fast, fully parameterized and secure. The 
verification of passes is done at edge router. 
Note that the IP Easy-pass mechanism which is adopted in the 
data plane is base on an important assumption. It is assumed that 
there exists a secure channel for QoS signaling in the control plane 
between a given end-host and the ISP edge router that connects the 
end-host to the Internet. Prior to data transfer, through the secure 
QoS signaling channel, the end-host and the ISP edge router must 
communicate shared secrets for generating Easy-passes. 
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND STUDY AND RELATED WORK 24 
2.3 Worm based DoS Attacks 
2.3.1 Introduction to the Worm based DoS Attacks 
Internet worms, which is malicious code that propagates over the 
Internet without or with very little human assistance [29], have be-
come a new threat towards the Internet. Massive worm-driven DDoS 
attacks have appeared and have been reported to cause great damage 
due to the bandwidth consumption [33], e.g. the Slammer Worm 
:41] which was the fastest worm in history, infected more than 90 
percent of vulnerable hosts within only 10 minutes, causing signif-
icant disruption to the Internet. And hosts infected by Code Red 
Worm [15] in 2001, were going to launch the Denial of Service At-
tack against www 1, whitehouse.gov from the 20th to the 28th of each 
month, windowsupdate.com was also attacked by the Blaster Worm 
in 2003 [6]. 
Internet Worm is a new effective tool to launch Denial of Ser-
vice attack. Since it can replicate itself independently and has many 
other automation properties. Unlike traditional DoS attack tools 
(Trioo, TFN200...), attackers do not need to compromise large num-
ber of hosts before launching the attack. Attack can be originated 
much easier than before. Usually worm is affected through system 
weakness (e.g. buffer overflow) or E-Mail, like worm Nimda can 
replicated itself not only through both the two ways above but also 
spread through windows file sharing protocol (SMB). It is reported 
that the disruption caused by Internet Worms significantly exceed 
that caused by other DoS attack tools [15]. 
2.3.2 Countermeasures to the Worm Based DoS Attacks 
Many mechanisms to defend the Internet worm have been proposed 
:16]，[62], [67]. Measures to counter the Internet worm are basically 
belongs to prospects: passive and active [35]. The passive measures 
attempts to block or slow down the worm traffic to prevent spread 
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and the active measure will try to proactively patch vulnerable hosts 
or remove infections from hosts in response to an attack. 
One of the most simple passive measures is Content Filtering. 
Defenses based on content filtering suppose that worm packets have 
discernible signatures. They discover and disseminate these signa-
tures to a distributed infrastructure that filters traffic to eliminate dis-
covered worm packets. Success of these defenses depends on very 
fast response to an attack, and a filtering infrastructure that protects 
a large fraction of the network. 
Another passive defense is based on blocking traffic from certain 
specific IP addresses (Address Blacklisting) that are known or sus-
pected to be infected by the worm. This method tends to be less 
effective than content filtering due to the delay in detecting every 
new infected host. 
Actually, to be effective, the passive measures require widespread 
deployment in the Internet. While active measures rather than just 
blocking worm scans, attempt to actively inhibit the spreading worm, 
such as launching a second worm that tries to patch vulnerable hosts 
to prevent infection or remove the first worm from infected systems, 
do not require infrastructure to be in place. Nicol et al presented 
five defense types (Empty defense, Simple Patch, Spreading Patch, 
Nullifying Patch and Sniper Defense) based on evaluating the level 
of activeness [44]. Moreover, worms that attempt to patch against or 
remove another worm have actually been seen in the wild, as in the 
case of the Welchia worm [20] removing Blaster. However, evidence 
has shown that Welchia has caused at least as much of a problem as 
Blaster. Thus more issues have to be considered for a successful 
active worm defense mechanism including both technical and legal 
issues. And research done by Michael Liljenstam et al provided a 
comparison between the passive and active worm countermeasures 
in terms of the effectiveness in preventing worm infections. With 
sufficient deployment, passive measures such as content based quar-
antining defenses are more effective than the active worms. 
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2.4 Low-rate TCP Attack and RoQ Attacks 
2.4.1 General Introduction of Low-rate Attack 
The low-rate TCP attack is first described by Kuzmanovic and Knightly 
[30], who characterize the attack and point out important challenges 
of detection and defense. It is a new kind of TCP targeted denial of 
service attack which is quite different from the common DoS/DDoS 
attacks. 
As describe before, in a successful common DoS/DDoS attack, 
a large number of hosts or agents will be involved. Although it is 
harmful, it is also relatively easy to be detected due to the large 
volume of attack traffic. For low-rate TCP DoS attack, the aim is to 
deny the bandwidth of legitimate TCP flows. The attacker will send 
a low volume of attack traffic to avoid detection. At the same time, 
the attack exploits the TCP congestion control feature and sends a 
periodic burst to the victim, either a web site or any upstream routers 
of the victim site. 
Since the average throughput is small, normal throughput based 
intrusion detection can not work. And information in the attack 
packet can be spoofed, there is no signature in each packet which 
means that the per packet analysis approach also may not be effec-
tive. Traditional packet filtering schemes are seriously challenged 
due to the above properties. There are several pieces of work ad-
dressing this problem as shown in [37], [12], [63], [65]. 
Since low-rate attacks are most effective when the retransmission 
attempts by TCP sources are synchronized following a congestion, 
randomizing the TCP RTO is an intuitive solution approach and has 
been shown to be effective in [65]. However, randomizing the RTO 
requires widespread updates of existing end user software and may 
reduce the performance of TCP under non-attack conditions [8]. In 
comparison, we seek a solution at the router level (Refer to the fol-
lowing chapters of the thesis). 
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2.4.2 Introduction of RoQ Attack 
Another work addressing similar problem appeared in [23]. The 
Reduction of Quality (RoQ) Attack presents a more general class 
of adversarial network traffic exploiting the transients of adaptation. 
It is shown that a well orchestrated attack could introduce signifi-
cant inefficiencies that could potentially deprive a network element 
from much of its capacity, or significantly reduce its service quality, 
while evading detection by consuming an unsuspicious, small frac-
tion of that elements hijacked capacity. A mathematical model was 
proposed and a measurement was carried at to illustrate the attack 
potency in [23]. Since the attack form presented [23] is similar to 
the low-rate attack (also periodic burst), we believe at least, our de-
tection and defense, mechanism presented in later chapters will shed 
light towards the solution to such RoQ attack. 
• End of chapter. 
Chapter 3 
Formal Description of Low-rate 
TCP Attacks 
Summary 
This chapter provides a mathematical description of the 
low-rate TCP attack in Section 3.1. This model covers the 
whole family of possible forms of attack that we consider 
to detect and defend. In Section 3.2, some more general 
forms of low-rate attack based on the math model are talked 
about.  
Because the low-rate attack can appear in many different forms 
(as describe below), let us first provide a formal model in describing 
a low-rate TCP attack. Given this mathematical description, one 
can generate a large family of low-rate attacks. We then proceed to 
describe how one can extract “signatures” from this large family of 
low-rate TCP attack flows. 
3.1 Mathematical Model of Low-rate TCP Attacks 
A low-rate TCP attack is essentially a periodic burst which exploits 
the homogeneity of the minimum retransmission timeout (RTO) of 
28 
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TCP flows. Consider a router with capacity C (with unit of bps), 
one form of attack is a periodic square wave as reported in [30]. The 
period of this square wave is denoted by T, which is approximately 
one second so as to effectively forcing other TCP flows to enter the 
retransmission period. Within each period, the square wave has a 
magnitude of zero except for I units of time. During this time, the 
square wave has a magnitude of a normalized burst of R. Note that 
in this work, the magnitude of the burst is normalized by the router's 
capacity C, therefore R E (0,1]. Although it is possible that in re-
ality R may exceed 1，in our model we mainly focus on the range 
(0,1], since when R > 1, it will clearly cause packet loss and can be 
treated as the same class with R= 1. The average normalized band-
width, of this periodic square wave is Rl/T. Again, the objective of 
the low-rate attack is that for a short duration I, the attack packets 
will fill up the buffer of a victimized router so that packets of any 
TCP flows have to be discarded by the router and forcing most, if 
not all TCP flows to enter the retransmission state. Also note that 
to be considered as a low-rate TCP attack, the ratio of I/T has to be 
small or else system administrators can easily detect a high volume 
attack. 
A general model of a low-rate TCP attack can be described by 
five parameters (T, /, R, S, N). The parameters T, I and R have 
the same meaning as described above, S denote the amount of time-
shift, starting from the initial measurement instant of the signal (e.g., 
t — 0) to the beginning of the attack pulse, while N denote the 
amount of background noise or traffic. The background noise is due 
to other UDP flows, which will not backoff in the midst of conges-
tion, or other TCP flows which are not in the retransmission period. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates an example of low-rate TCP attack traffic. 
Let us define the valid range of these five parameters. 
• Values for T: As indicated in [30], the most effective value for 
the periodic low-rate attack is T = 1 second. In our study, we 
consider a larger range of T, which is T G [1.0,1.5 . 
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Figure 3.1: Low-rate attack traffic with parameters (T, R, 5, N). 
• Values for I: Assume that we have K TCP flows which are 
affected by the low-rate TCP attack. Let RTTi represents the 
round-trip time from the source i of the TCP flow to the vic-
timized router. To have an effective attack, the low-rate attack 
burst length should last long enough to keep the router's queue 
full for all RTT timescales. Therefore, I > maxi {i^TTj，for 
i = 1 ,2 , . . . , X. Since the aim of the low-rate TCP attack is to 
avoid sending a high volume of traffic so as to avoid easy de-
tection, the value of I cannot be very close to T. In our study, 
we have max^{i^TTj < I < 0iT where < 0.3. 
• Values for R\ Since this is a normalized burst with respect to 
the router's capacity C, we have R G (0,1 . 
• Value of S: The amount of time-shift S, starting from the ini-
tial point of measurement (e.g.,力二 0) to the beginning of the 
attack pulse, has a valid range of 0 < 5 < T - /. 
• Value of N: The amount of normalized background noise due 
to other UDP or TCP packets, it has a valid range of 0 < TV < 
P2R where P2 < 0.5. Note that background noise is a general 
assumption, which exists most of the time in realtime signal 
processing. Note that adding a background noise to the model 
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makes the detection a more challenging task. Yet, in realistic 
situation, noise is always present in the sampled traffic. 
3.2 Other forms of Low-rate TCP Attacks 
Based on the mathematics model above, more general attack wave 
form can be generated. For example, the attack traffic can be of the 
form of sine wave and an attacker can also generate different burst 
patterns within each sub-period. Figure 3.2 illustrates an instance 
of the general attack traffic which has three attack sub-periods, each 
sub-period has a different attack characteristic. The first sub-period 
has Ti = 0.8 sec and h 二 0.1 sec, the second sub-period has — 
1.2 sec and I2 = 0.3 sec while the last sub-period has T3 = 1.0 
sec and I = 0.2 sec. The generality of attack waveforms makes it 
difficult and challenging to characterize, detect and defend the low-
rate TCP attack. 
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Figure 3.2: General attack traffic with a varying pattern within each sub-period. 
Another important point that is worth mentioning is that the low-
rate TCP attack can be launched by either a single source, or by mul-
tiple distributed sources. For the single source attack, it is easy to 
generate and it is effective when there is sufficient bandwidth along 
the path between the attack source and the victimized router. For 
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the distributed low-rate TCP attack, it is also possible to synchro-
nize attacks over independent sources on the Internet, since jitter on 
the Internet is usually small, and it is on the order of IRTT < 100ms. 
However, compared with single source attack, issues concerning dif-
ferent propagation and transmission delays to the victimized router 
still need to be addressed. Thus, more effort is needed to gener-
ate a distributed attack. There are at least two approaches to gen-
erate a distributed attack. For the first approach, each of the M 
attack sources generates a homogeneous and periodic attack wave-
form with a normalized burst size of R > 1/M. These flows will 
converge into a sufficient large burst at the victimized router and 
force all affected TCP flows to backoff. Another possible form of 
distributed attack, which has a lower synchronization requirement, 
is that each attack source generates a large burst but for a longer 
period. For example, each of the M attack sources generates a ho-
mogeneous and periodic attack waveform with T = M seconds and 
a normalized burst size of R= 1. This kind of attack is illustrated in 
Figure 3.3 for three distributed attackers. The i仇 attack source sends 
the attack burst at the i认 attacking sub-period and keeps silent for 
the remaining sub-periods. The converged attack traffic is illustrated 
in Figure 3.3(d). 
• End of chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
Distributed Detection Mechanism 
Summary 
This chapter provides the detection solution to the low-rate 
attack. First, the general idea of distributed detection mech-
anism is presented (Section 4.1). Then the detail detection 
algorithm is provided from Section 4.2 to Section 4.6. Fi-
nally, groups of experiments of detection solution are con-
ducted in Section 4.7. 
4.1 General Consideration of Distributed Detection 
Before we discuss how to defend against this family of low-rate TCP 
attacks, the first issue we need to address is how to perform an effec-
tive detection and that the detection method has to be computational 
efficient. Unlike other intrusion detection or DDoS detection meth-
ods [38] [66], one cannot simply install the detection mechanism at 
the victim site, say S (i.e., a web server). The reasons are as fol-
lows: First, to install the detection mechanism at the victim site, 
status of thousands of incoming TCP flows need to be monitored 
which maybe a burden to the server. More importantly, the low-rate 
TCP attack has the intrinsic characteristic to throttle legitimate TCP 
34 
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traffics at the victim site S. Therefore, an attacker does not neces-
sary need to aim the attack at the victim site, but rather at a “subset 
of upstream routers" of S so as to throttle all TCP flows passing 
through these routers. Thus installing a detection mechanism at the 
victim will be ineffective since it provides no information for the 
victim site to determine where the attack is occurring, or the attack 
traffic is originated from which part of the network. As a result, any 
detection method installed at the victim site may not be very effec-
tive because the victim site only may not even detect the existence of 
attack. Instead, the victim site may think that only few users are in-
terested to access information from the site S if is under the low-rate 
attack. 
In this work, we propose a distributed detection mechanism that 
is installed at a set of routers which are /c > 1 hops away from the 
victim site. Each router needs to perform the low-rate TCP attack 
detection on the output port that is forwarding packets to the victim 
site S. If a low-rate TCP attack is detected, then the router needs 
to determine which input port(s) the low-rate attack is coming from. 
Detection will then be carried out on all these input ports of the 
affected router. If a low-rate attack is detected on an input port, 
say V, then the affected router will push back the detection to all 
upstream routers that are connected to the input V. If the affected 
router cannot detect any low-rate attack on any of its input port, this 
implies that the low-rate attack is carried out in a distributed manner, 
then the defense mechanism (which we will discuss in Chapter 5) 
will be carried out. Note that there are several important features of 
using the above distributed detection mechanism. They are: 
• Detection is carried out from the output port to the input ports. 
• Pushing the detection of low-rate attacks as close as possible 
to the attack sources so as to minimize the damage to other 
legitimate TCP flows when adopting the defense mechanism 
(Chapter 5). 
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The overall detection mechanism is as follows: 
Distributed Detection Mechanism 
Let 1Z be the enabled router. Vi is the set of input port of 
IZ, Vo is the output port IZ uses to forward packet to the 
victim site S. 
1.1Z determines the existence of low-rate attack on Vo\ 
2. If (low-rate attacks exist) { 
determine the existence of low-rate attack on Vi\ 
3. If (attack exits for input port V ^Vi) { 
4. signals all upstream routers connected to 
Vi to perform distributed low-rate attack 
detection; 
5. } 
6. execute the defense mechanism describes in Sec. 5; 
7 } 
Let us describe in detail about the low-rate attack detection algo-
rithm. 
4.2 Design of Low-rate Attack Detection Algorithm 
Because attack packets can be easily generated, all information in 
the packets' header can be spoofed, e.g., IP source addresses and 
types of transport protocol used, and there is no easy way to accu-
rately differentiate low-rate TCP attacking packets from legitimate 
packets. The proper approach for the low-rate TCP attack detection 
is to compare the incoming traffic with attack pattern signatures. 
The detection mechanism will be installed at enabled routers and 
the detection mechanism involves the following steps. 
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• Statistical sampling of incoming traffic: traffic will be sam-
pled and normalized based on the transmission capacity of the 
link/port. 
• Noise filtering: since other packets which arrive during the 
non-active period of the low-rate attack will also be included in 
the sampling process, therefore, one needs to perform filtering 
before the feature extraction process. 
• Feature extraction: perform a computationally efficient fea-
ture extraction that is immune to time and space shift of the 
input signals. 
• Signatures comparison: compare the extracted features of the 
incoming traffic with the signature of the low-rate TCP attack. 
In the following, let us describe in detail the individual step involves 
in the distributed detection mechanism. 
4.3 Statistical Sampling of Incoming Traffic 
The router needs to periodically sample the incoming traffic at a 
constant rate. Note that each sample consists of a record of through-
put of the link interface. The record of throughput is the measured 
throughput between two sample points. The rate of sampling should 
be frequent enough to record slight variation of the throughput, and 
at the same time, it should not put a heavy computational burden 
on the router. In our experiments, we set the rate of sampling to be 
100 samples per second which means we will estimate the through-
put every 0.01 second. Note that statistical sampling can be easily 
achieved using standardized algorithms. Additionally, we use Tg to 
denote the length of each sampling period, which should be prop-
erly chosen. In order to capture the periodicity property of the low-
rate TCP attack, the sampling period should be lower bounded by 
Ts > 2T according to the sampling theory. One should also put an 
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upper bound on Tg. Note that a high value of Tg implies a higher 
storage cost and a higher computational cost for features extraction 
at the later stage and larger delay in detecting the attack. In our ex-
periments and prototype, we set Ts = 3 seconds. Thus we have 300 
estimated values of throughput in each sampling period when we set 
the sampling rate to be 100 samples per second. Another technical 
issue we have to consider is the traffic normalization. Since different 
link interface may have different line speed, to facilitate feature ex-
traction and comparison at the later stage, the sampled traffic signal 
of a given link interface will be normalized based on its line speed 
such that 
Sampled Throughput Normalized Throughput = — ： — —. Maximum Line Capacity 
4.4 Noise Filtering 
Since other packets which arrive during the inactive period of a low-
rate attack will also be included in the sampling process, one has 
to perform filtering before the feature extraction process. Note that 
beside the potential low-rate TCP attack traffic, some other pack-
ets may also be included in the sampling process. These packets 
include: 
• Packets that got forwarded to the same interface but they are 
not designated to the victim site S. 
• TCP packets, especially from flows with large RTT, which may 
be able to survive under the low-rate TCP attack. Please refer 
to [30]. 
• UDP packets which will not backoff in the face of low-rate 
attack or network congestion. 
These types of traffic have either a higher frequency or a smaller 
magnitude, as compared with the burst magnitude of a low-rate at-
tack. To get a clean signal, a low-pass filter can be used to filter the 
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high frequencies and at the same time, clamp all sampled signal to 
zero if it is less than or equal to a fraction (5 of the peak value R. In 
our experiments and prototype, we set it to be less or equal to the 
maximum value of the normalized background noise N, or (3 < 0.5. 
4.5 Feature Extraction 
Auto-correlation is used to extract the periodic signatures of an in-
put signal. Using the auto-correlation measure not only because it 
is easy to calculate (i.e., for a sampled input of size n, the computa-
tional complexity is 6(n^)), but one can also check the randomness 
or periodicity of a given signal in the presence of the time shifting 
variable S. 
Auto-correlation is calculated with the unbiased internal normal-
ization. The unbiased normalization is necessary if the input sig-
nal has a finite sequence. Consider an input signal with n values 
(xo, xi, • • • ,Xn-i) and all other Xi = 0. The unbiased normalized 
auto-correlation A{k) can be calculated as follows: 
1 n—k+l 
A(k) = y ^ Xi^kXi A; = 0, . . . , n - l . (4.1) n-k ^ 1=0 
To illustrate this concept, consider the following auto-correlation 
plots. Figure 4.1(a) shows the noise-filtered input signal with time 
shift S = 0.3 sec and periodic property of T = 1 and I = 0.2 
seconds respective. Note that this is the “classical，，low-rate at-
tack wave. Figure 4.1(b) shows the corresponding auto-correlation 
plot. One important observation is that the peak-to-peak distance is 
1, which captures the period of the input signal and that the auto-
correlation plot is the same independent on the time shift value S. 
Consider a more complicated attack wave which is illustrated in Fig-
ure 4.2(a). In this attack, the time shift S = 0.5，the first period 
T = l second. For the first attack period, the burst length is h = 0.1 
while the second attack period has the burst length of = 0.3. The 
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auto-correlation plot in Figure 4.2(b) reveals the existence of a pe-
riod (e.g., the peak-to-peak distance in the auto-correlation plot) and 
that bursts may have different durations. 
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We extract the feature of auto-correlation plot from an input sig-
nal, not only because it captures the periodicity property of the input 
signal but it also eliminates the problem of time shifting. For the 
remaining question, we need to address how to compare the auto-
correlation plot of an input signal with the auto-correlation plot (or 
signature) of a low-rate attack. 
CHAPTER 4. DISTRIBUTED DETECTION MECHANISM 41 
4.6 Pattern Matching via the Dynamic Time Warp-
ing (DTW) Method 
After the first three steps, features are extracted from the sampled in-
put, one has to compare the similarity of the extracted features with 
the signature of the low-rate attack traffic and decide whether there 
is an on going low-rate attack. Note that an example signature of the 
low-rate attack is depicted in Figure 4.1(b). If the auto-correlation 
plot of the sampled input is exactly the same as this signature, one 
can easily conclude the existence of a low-rate attack. However, not 
all auto-correlation plots of sampled inputs will match exactly as 
the signature, for instance, the auto-correlation plot in Figure 4.2b). 
Therefore, one has to do proper processing so as to make an accurate 
decision. • 
The mechanism we adopted is called the dynamic time warping 
(DTW) [27,52]. It is a robust and computational efficient method 
to compare the similarity between a template signature and an input 
signal, even when the input signal is subjected to changes in time 
scale and magnitude. The dynamic time warping algorithm can be 
described as follows. Suppose there are two time series, the template 
S and an input signal X, of length n and m respectively, where 
S = s i , 52 ,S3 , and 
丄 — • • • 5 m^-
To compare the similarity of these two time series using DTW, one 
can construct an n-by-m distance matrix T> where d(x, y) of V rep-
resents the Euclidean distance between the signature value s^ and 
the input signal value iy, that is 
d(3C, y) Hhrr — iy || for 1 < X < n； 1 < ^ < 772. 
A warping path W, is a contiguous set of matrix element V that 
defines a mapping between the template S and input I . The k^^ ele-
ment of W is defined as Wk = d(ikjk) where W 二 wi,w2,w3, ...,Wk, ..”vok 
and max(m, n)<K<m-\-n-{-l. 
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The construction of the warping path W is subjected to the fol-
lowing constraints: 
1. Boundary constraint: wi = d{l, 1) and wk = d(n,m), this 
requires the warping path W to start and finish in diagonally 
opposite corner cells of the matrix V. 
2. Continuity constraint: Given Wk = d(a, b) then Wk+i = d{a', b') 
where a' — a < 1 and b' - b < 1. This restricts the allowable 
steps in the warping path to be adjacent cells. 
3. Mono tonicity constraint: Given Wk = d{a, b) then Wk+i = 
d(a/, b') where a^ - a > 0 and b' - b>0. This restricts points 
in W to be monotonically spaced in time. 
Note that there are many warping paths that satisfy the above con-
straints. However, we are interested in the path that minimizes the 
warping cost of S and I . Formally: 
/ p ^ \ 
DTW\S,1) = min . w^；/, . (4.2) 
\ \| k=\ 
In other words, the lower the value of DTW*{S,I), then the in-
put string 1 has higher similarity degree as compare with the sig-
nature S. The minimum cost warping path can be found using the 
dynamic programming approach. That is, we construct a matrix 7 
with dimension of n-by-m, the entry 7(2;, y) in cell (x, y) defines 
the cumulative distances of the warping path W from position (1,1) 
to positive (x, y). The minimum of the cumulative distances of the 
adjacent elements 7(x, y) is: 
7 (工 = d(x,y) + (4.3) 
where 1 < x < n; 1 < ^ < m. At each step of calculating the value 
ofj(x,y), if the min{7(x - l,y — 1)’7(工一1,")，70 , " — 1 ) } = 
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7(0： — 1, or 7(:r,�一1)，it means that there is one point in the input 
signal I that has been matched twice to the template or there is 
one point in S that has been matched twice to I . 
From Equation (4.3), one can see that similar but not identi-
cal patterns can match each other with DTW value of 0，i.e, pat-
terns with the same magnitude of burst but different periods like 
{0,0,0，1,1,1,0} and {0,0,0,1,1,0,0}. Although this scenario is 
common in other applications like speech recognition and can be 
viewed as the homology of the input and the template, they should 
not be treated as identical attack traffic pattern. As a result, we made 
a modification to the original DTW algorithm that adds some adap-
tive penalty p for this kind of vertical or horizontal "movement" in 
the warping path so as to evaluate the similarity while still distin-
guish the slight difference. Note that the value of the penalty should 
not be too large since it will increase the DTW value of similar at-
tacks, thus, increase the possibility of false positive or false neg-
ative in the detection process. In general, the upper limit of this 
penalty should not exceed the average value of the template's auto-
correlation. As a result, the function of calculating the cumulative 
distances in our system is: 
7 ( 工 = I I Sa； - iy II + m i n{7 ( x - l , y - l ) , 
7 0 — 1，y) 7 ( x， 1 ) + p } (4.4) 
After creating this matrix 7, the value 7(n, m) is the minimum cu-
mulative distances of the DTW between the template S and the input 
1 and it is the solution to Equation (4.2). 
To illustrate, consider the following example wherein S = 
{0,0,0,0,1,1,1} and I = {0，0,0,0,1,1,0.8，0.8}. The matrix 7 
and the warping path W are depicted in Figure 4.3. In general, a 
lower value of DTW implies that the input signal I is very similar 
to the signature S. 
Additionally, from Figure 4.3, the process of generating the ma-
trix 7 by using dynamic programming approach to find the minimum 
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Figure 4.3: Distance matrix 7 and the warping path W with p = 0. 
DTW value can be seen vividly. The matrix is built column by col-
umn, from left to right and from top down for each column. 
The whole procedure of the detection mechanism inside each de-
ployed router can be stated as follows: 
Detection Procedure 
Assume the capacity of each input port or output port of 
the router is Cp and the size of sampled input traffic is m. 
1. Sample the incoming traffic of the current input 
port or output port, call it 1慨1\ 
2. Normalize the throughput: In = 
3. For 2 = l t o m { / * remove n o i s e * / 
If (/Ar(z) < NoiseThreshold ) 
lF{i) 二 0; Else M i ) = / ivW; 
1 
4. Calculate the auto-correlation of the filtered input 
Ia = Auto — cor relation (JF) 
5. Using dynamic programming approach to calculate the 
DTW value of input signal Ia and the template signal S 
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D = DTW(S,IA)； 
6. If (D <= Attack Threshold) 
Low-rate TCP Attack = True; 
7. Else Low-rate TCP Attack = False; 
To implement such detection mechanism, one may choose to put 
the dynamic detection within a router, or outside a router. To put the 
detection outside a router, one needs to use a signal splitter so that 
traffics from a port can be copied to a computing node and the com-
puting node can then perform the dynamic detection on a port by 
port basis. It is important to point out that the computational com-
plexity of the detection algorithm is very low and it can be carried 
out in a polynomial time using a dynamic programming approach. 
In particular, for an input size of m and template size of n, the com-
putational complexity of this DTW is 6(mn) . 
4.7 Robustness and Accuracy of DTW 
Let us consider the robustness and accuracy of using the DTW method 
to detect a low-rate TCP attack. The experiment setup is as follows, 
or the template of low-rate attack signature, we consider T = 1.2 
sec, I = 0.2 sec, R = 1.0 smd S = N = 0. Note that although 
we choose this signature values as the default template in our ex-
periments of the detection, our methodology is general enough for 
detecting a large family of attack traffic. For the input traffic, we 
sample 100 times per second and the sampling duration is three sec-
onds per detection. We set the noise filter threshold P2 = 0.3, the 
maximum average throughput of low-rate attack, so that all back-
ground traffic that is less than or equal to 30% of the maximum link 
capacity C will be clamped to zero. Under the DTW, we set the 
penalty value p = 0.01. We consider the following four types of 
attack traffic: 
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• Strictly Periodic Square Burst (SPSB): a strictly periodic sig-
nal with a single burst of length I within a period T. The values 
of I and T are the same for each period. 
• Random Periodic Square Burst (RPSB): a randomly gener-
ated periodic signal with a single burst of length I within a pe-
riod T. The values of I and T between different periods can 
be different and they are drawn from a uniform distribution (as 
described below). 
• Strictly Periodic General hurst (SPGB): a strictly periodic sig-
nal which is generated by a sine wave with period T with an 
added random noise N. The values of T and N are the same 
for each period. In reality, the general burst may not be limited 
to sine wave； and it can be any periodic burst waveform. 
• Random Periodic General hurst (RPGB): a randomly gener-
ated periodic sine wave with a period of T and with and added 
random noise N. The values of T and N are drawn from uni-
form distributions (as described below) and these values may 
be different from one period to another period. 
4.7.1 DTW values for low-rate attack: 
To generate an input traffic, the period T is uniformly distributed 
within [1,1.5]. The burst length is uniformly distributed within (0,0.5], 
The background noise N is uniformly distributed in [0,0.5], the time 
shift S is uniformly distributed in [0,T] and the magnitude of the 
burst is set io R 1. We generate around 3000 samples for each 
of the four types of input traffic discussed above. The results are 
illustrated in Table 4.1. From the result, one can observe that a large 
family of low-rate attack has a DTW value which is less than or 
equal to 35.66. 
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Values of 
DTW SPSB RPSB SPGB RPGB 
M a x D T W 3 5 . 6 6 34.08 34.69 
Min DTW 0 0.80 0.84 1.20 
Mean DTW 10.68 9.63 10.89 10.48 
Table 4.1: DTW values for three types of attack traffic. 
4.7.2 DTW values for legitimate traffic (Gaussian): 
The detection mechanism must distinguish legitimate traffic from 
the attack stream so as to avoid possible false positive or false neg-
ative alert. Therefore, it is desirable to achieve that the minimum 
DTW value of the legitimate traffic be larger than the maximum 
DTW value of any attack traffic so as to reduce the possibility of 
false positive/negative during the detection. 
We carry out the following experiment on legitimate traffic. Based 
on our assumption before, if there is no low-rate attack, the TCP 
flows will not back off, all the traffic including TCP and UDP traf-
fic will go through the router properly. We assume that the normal 
traffic consists of a major constant throughput with some Gaussian 
noises. In other words: legitimate traffic = + random[0, iV], 
where Ci G [0.3,1] and N G [0,0.5]. We vary the value of Ci by a 
step size of 0.01 and for each value of Ci, we generate around 100 
different values of N. The results are depicted in Table 4.2. As one 
can observe, the minimum DTW value for the Gaussian legitimate 
traffic is above 110 which is much higher than the maximum DTW 
value of attack traffic reported above. And Figure 4.4 illustrates the 
probability density function of the DTW values for attack and Gaus-
sian flows respectively. From the figure, we observe that there is a 
clear gap between the Gaussian legitimate traffic and the low-rate 
attack traffic. Finding a pint to differentiate between legitimate or 
attack traffic can be easily carried out. 
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Gaussian Traffic 
Max DTW 286.53 
Min DTW 113.50 
Mean DTW 236.95 
Table 4.2: DTW values for legitimate traffic (Gaussian). 
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Figure 4.4: Probability density functions of DTW values for the attack and the 
Gaussian legitimate traffic. 
4.7.3 DTW values for legitimate traffic (Self-similar): 
As Gaussian traffic may not perfectly represent all legitimate traf-
fics, we also consider using the self-similar Traffic Model to repre-
sent legitimate traffic. It is shown that both the Ethernet local area 
network [32] and the World Wide Web traffic [14] are statistically 
self-similar. 
Self-similar traffic can be described mathematically. Let X 二 
{Xt,t = 1,2,3, . . .)bea time series with the mean /i and variance a^. 
The limit of the autocorrelation function r(k) = E[{Xt — ii)�Xt+k -
IJ,)]/E[{Xt — /i)2], {k = 0,1,2,…)，when k is approaching infinity, 
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is 
hmk - oorik) = AT 义 （4.5) 
where 0 < < 1. For each m 二 1,2,3,..., there is a new time 
series =�X产, t = 1,2,3,…)，which is generated by dividing 
the original series X = {Xt,t = 1,2,3,...) into m non-overlapping 
segments, where X!爪)=l/m(Xtm-m+i + …+ Xtm), t > I. If the 
autocorrelation of 义(爪）has the same structure as that of X, i.e., 
r ( — �= r(/c), 
then X is said to be (asymptotically) second order self-similar with 
degree H = 1- where H is called Hurst Parameter. Previous 
works have shown that the Hurst Parameter H for common Internet 
traffic is around 0.80. 
Based on the definition before, we generate a large number of 
self-similar traffics using the FARIMA model [24,36]. We generate 
the self-similar traffic with Hurst Parameter H from 0.75 to 0.85 by 
the step of 0.01 and 1000 samples for each H with the average rate 
of throughput ranging from 0.05 to 0.95. The results are depicted in 
Table 4.3 and the probability density function of the DTW values for 
attack and Self-similar flows is illustrated in Figure 4.5. 
Self-similar Traffic 
Max DTW 238.16 
Min DTW 28.01 
Mean DTW 130.73 
Table 4.3: DTW values for self-similar legitimate traffic. 
One can observe that the minimum DTW value for self-similar 
legitimate traffic is less than the maximum DTW value of attack 
traffic before. Therefore, some false positive and false negative may 
occur during the detection. However, as shown in Figure 4.5, the 
value of self-similar traffic is mainly distributed from 28 to around 
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Figure 4.5: Probability density functions of DTW values for the attack and the 
self-similar legitimate traffic. 
238, the intersection area of the attack traffic and the self-similar 
traffic is rather small compared with both the area of attack traffic 
and Self-similar traffic separately. Thus the detection mechanism 
can still be efficient by restricting the false positive and false nega-
tive to a small proportion. As depicted in Table 4.4, among 11000 
values of self-similar traffic that we generated only 141 of them are 
less than the maximum DTW value of the attack traffic. Thus the 
maximum possible false positive is only a around 1% if one sets the 
attack threshold as the maximum DTW value of attack traffic (i.e., 
35.66). Similarly, the maximum possible false negative is around 
3.5% if one sets the attack threshold as the minimum DTW value 
of the self-similar legitimate traffic (i.e., 28.01). In summary, the 
� F a l s e S lf-similar 141 False Attack 378 
Total Self-similar 11000 Total Attack 11492 
Max False Positive 1.28% Max False Negative 3 . 5 4 ^ 
Table 4.4: False detection between attack and Self-similar traffic. 
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proposed detection mechanism can successfully distinguish the at-
tack traffic and legitimate traffic with low false positive and/or false 
negative. 
• End of chapter. 
Chapter 5 
Low-Rate Attack Defense 
Mechanism 
Summary 
This chapter provides the defense solution to the low-rate 
attack. First, based on the algorithm of Deficit Round 
Robin, we provide the defense mechanism (Section 5.1). 
Then theoretical analysis of DRR algorithm is presented in 
Section 5.2. 
5.1 Design of Defense Mechanism 
As we discussed in the distributed detection mechanism in Chapter 
4，an enabled router IZ first determines the existence of low-rate at-
tack on an output port V�which it uses to forward packet to a victim 
site. When a low-rate attack is discovered, IZ will then determine 
the input port that the low-rate attack is coming from. In other word, 
IZ needs to execute the detection algorithm on each of its input port. 
If the low-rate attack is coming from the input port V’ then 1Z needs 
to signal all upstream routers which are directly connected to V to 
execute the distributed low-rate detection algorithm and execute the 
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defense mechanism. The motivation of this type of push back is to 
determine the attack as close to the source as possible. This way, we 
minimize the number of affected TCP flows. 
When a router TZ discovers the existence of low-rate attack on 
its output port but cannot discover the existence of low rate attack 
on any of its input ports, this implies that the attack may be using a 
distributed approach in launching the low-rate attack, for example, 
sending a short burst at each input port of IZ so that these short bursts 
will converge to a low-rate attack an the output port of IZ. Under 
this scenario, the router IZ needs to perform the necessary resource 
management so as to minimize the damaging effect to TCP flows 
going through the output port VQ. 
In our work, we use the deficit round robin (DRR) algorithm to 
provide the bandwidth allocation and resource protection. The moti-
vation of using DRR is its near perfect isolation of ill-behaved source 
at a very low implementation cost. 
In our case, instead of classifying packet based on its flow, we 
classify packet according to the input port of IZ. Let Vi denote the 
set of input ports of the router IZ and \Vi\ denote the number of in-
put ports. We have \Vi\ classes and packets coming from input port 
i which are forwarded to output port Vo will be classified as class i, 
where i 二 1 , . . . , \Vi\. The DRR assigns a Quantum[i] of service to 
each class i in each round and attempts to serve packets from each 
class on a per round basis. Each class has a deficit counter, which is 
deficit_c0unter[i] and it is initialized to zero, for i = 1, . . . , \Vi\. At 
the beginning of a round, deficit counter of each non-empty class i 
will be increased by the Quantum[i] value (Usually the values of all 
Quantum[i] are unique and set as Quantum). A packet from class 
i will be served if the size of the packet is less than or equal to the 
value in deficit_c0unter[i]. When a packet is transmitted from class 
i, its deficit value will be adjusted by deficit_count[i] -= packet's 
size. If there is no packet in class i，then we reset the deficit counter 
as deficit_c0unt[i] = 0. Note that the deficit of the previous rounds 
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gets carried over to the next round and it is only reset to zero when-
ever there is no packet in that class. 
5.2 Analysis of Deficit Round Robin Algorithm 
During the traffic scheduling, although packets from different classes 
(or input ports) can have different sizes, fairness can still be achieved. 
As shown in [55,56], the difference in the normalized bytes sent be-
tween classes within a certain interval (ti,亡2) is bounded by a small 
constant. 
We say that class i is backlogged during an interval (ti,力2) of 
a DRR execution if the queue for class i is never empty during 
the interval. We define q as the class share obtained by the class 
i that a = Q q : = 丨 where Quantum = Mm(Quantum[ i ] ) . Let 
senti{ti,t2) be the total number of bytes sent on the output port by 
class i in the interval (ti,力2). Therefore, the measurement of fair-
ness FM( t i , 2^) can be expressed as the maximum difference in the 
normalized bytes sent for class i and j during (ti,力2): 
FM{ti,t2) = max(senti(ti,t2)/Q - sentj{ti,t2)/cj). 
Lemma 1 For any class z, during the execution of DRR algorithm, 
the deficit_c0unter[i] is bounded below by 0 and bounded above 
by Max, where Max is the maximum packet size of all possible 
packets. Formally, we have 
0 < deficit_counter[i] < Max. (5.1) 
Proof: Please refer to the appendix. • 
Lemma 2 During any period in which class i is backlogged, the num-
ber of bytes sent on the behalf on class i is bounded by 
m . Quantum[i] - Max < senti(fy,t<2) < m • Quantum[i] + Max 
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where m is the number of round-robin service opportunities received 
by class i during this interval. 
Proof: Please refer to the appendix. • 
The above two lemmas provide bounds for deficit_counter[i] and 
senti{ti,t2). Now we can provide an upper bound on the fairness 
measure. 
Theorem 1 Under the DRR service discipline, for an interval (ti,亡2), 
we have the following fairness measure: 
FM{tu 力 2 ) < 2 . Max + Quantum, 
�J •么） 
where Quantum = Mm(Quantum[i]). 
Proof: Please refer to the appendix. • 
As a result, it is easy to observe that the fairness between classes 
achieved using DRR algorithm. Additionally, The DRR algorithm is 
also known to be efficient and can be easily implemented compared 
with other scheduling algorithm [50]. In general, the processing cost 
of DRR is 0(1) per packet. As a matter of fact, DRR has already 
been implemented in some of the Cisco's routers [7]. 
• End of chapter. 
Chapter 6 
Fluid Model of TCP Flows 
Summary 
To estimate the effectiveness of defense mechanism, we de-
velop a fluid model of TCP flows. Based on the model, a 
set of simulations are designed and results are analyzed. 
6.1 Fluid Math. Model of TCP under DRR 
To anticipate the effectiveness of DRR, we model the behavior of 
different TCP flows using Differential Equations. A TCP model 
with droptail router was first presented based on the fluid model of 
TCP [39]. We extend the original model with slow start phrase and 
one second timeout mechanism so as to explore the transient behav-
ior of TCP flows. Then, we came with the model of TCP under 
DRR scheduling. Simulations were conducted in order to compare 
the effectiveness of different scheduling mechanism in busy router. 
6.1.1 Model of TCP on a Droptail Router 
In a congested router with Droptail scheduling algorithm, let N TCP 
flows labeled i = 1 …N traverse the router. For each output inter-
face, there is a common droptail queue which starts to drop packets 
56 
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when the queue is full. The dropping function of the droptail queue 
can be written like: 
刺 = 工4》 (6.1) 
[ 1 , X i � Q i 
where Qi is the size of queue i in the router and xi is the length of 
queue i. Usually, the size of queues in a router are the same Q. 
Base on the original fluid model [39], the queue length xi will 
change as follows: 
, N 
i 二 [ p m • [ 1 — - (6.2) 
i=l 
The first term demotes the increase of queue length due to all the in-
coming traffic from N TCP flows destined to current output queue. 
And the second term represents the packets sending rate of the queue. 
For the Fluid TCP model, as shown in [39], the instantaneous 
throughput of TCP flow i is: 
幽 = S i (6.3) 
Here Wi{t) and Ri{t) denote the TCP window size and round trip 
time at t > 0, of flow i,i = 1, ...N. In a router with Droptail 
scheduling, the estimated round trip time of past TCP flows should 
take from: 
m = + ^ (6.4) 
where a^  is the fixed propagation delay and Xi{t)/C approximates 
the queuing delay with the capacity C of the current queue. 
For the behavior of the window size Wi{t) for flow z, from [39], 
we have the following equation: 
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璧 = - V , (6.5) 
dt R 人 t) 
�) ( 1 - - 0 ) 
Let q{Wi{t)) denote the probability that the loss is caused by a 
Timeout, given the window size at the time of loss Wi{t). As in [39, 
45], we use the simplified function q{Wi{t)) = M i n ( l , 3/Wi{t)) to 
express q{Wi{t)). Intuitively, this expression for Q is based on the 
assumption that all packets in a particular round are equally likely 
to be dropped, with at most one drop per round. In that case, any 
one of the last 3 packets in a round can cause a timeout if dropped. 
The first term on the right of Equation 6.5 describes the congestion 
avoidance in which the TCP window size will increase by one per 
round trip time and the last two terms express the multiple decrease 
of window size when TCP receives triple duplicated ACKs or incurs 
timeout. 
To add the slow start phrase of TCP to the model, another term， 
the threshold H, should be imported. The threshold will remain the 
same until loss occurs. In case of loss, the threshold becomes half 
of the current window size. 
^m = H办-t')[l-p{x,{t - t'))] + - t')) (6.6) 
TCP stays in the slow start phrase in which windows size doubles 
per round trip time until its window size Wi{t) exceeds the threshold 
Hi. Thus by using the unit step function (6.7)， 
, �J 0 ， n “ 0 
咖 ） H i \ n (6-7) [ 1 , n i > 0 
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we can add slow-start phrase to equation (6.5): 
T -識.⑴一恥⑴]+点•州一恥 (6 .8) 
+ 雜 暴 。 ） 
(叫t))(l - 糊 ) : : ( ( 二 : ) ) M 冲 - 0 ) 
To model the detail transient behavior of TCP, it is necessary to 
include the timeout feature. As we know, in a congested router, 
when loss occurs and TCP detects loss via the timeout event, TCP 
will decrease the window size to one, enter the slow start phrase and 
retransmit the lost packet with a timer initialized to be the default 
timeout value [8]. If this packet gets lost again, TCP will keep silent 
until the timer expires. In our model we assume that in a busy router 
with both TCP and UDP traffic, once the traffic is congested and loss 
happens, TCP flow will incur multiple continuous losses and thus 
will keep silent at least for the default timeout. Also we bypass the 
exponential back off of TCP in our model and use the default lower 
bound timeout value 1 second as recommended in [8] constantly to 
approximate the TCP timeout feature. We use 7] to denote the start 
time of latest continuous losses of flow i. And J] will be updated by 
the current time t when timeout happens and TCP is in，non-silent， 
state. As shown in Equation (6.9): 
^ = {t-T,{t))p{x{t - 以[力一(1 + T,(t))] (6.9) 
step function u[t - (1 + Ti{t))] express the state if TCP is silent due 
to the timeout and p{x{t - t'))q{Wi{t)) gives the probability of loss 
detected via timeout. 
And finally, the behavior of TCP window size can be modified 
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into Equation (6.10) 
^^ =(識聊)-酬聊)命(1+糊 
‘ ‘ (6.10) 
-剛二))辦—0) 
Now we have a group of differential equations (6.1),(6.2),(6.3), 
(6.4),(6.6),(6.7),(6.9),(6.10) to describe the behavior of TCP flows 
under Droptail scheduling. By solving these equations numerically, 
we could get a meaningful overview of TCP droptail scheduling. 
6.1.2 Model of TCP on a DRR Router 
Our model of DRR scheduling of TCP will mainly derived from the 
Droptail model above. Thus the model is divided into two parts: 
DRR Queue management in the router and TCP throughput adapta-
tion. 
DRR Queue management: When to drop a packet in a DRR queue? 
Actually DRR works similar a drop tail router which start to drop 
packet when the queue is full. So the dropping function of DRR is 
the same as function (6.1). 
We model the change of the queue length Xi per round. Thus 
At = T, r is the time length of each round. Here we use the time 
label t to denote the very round which is running at time t. (It starts 
at ti and ends at 力2，亡 i < ^ < and 力 2 — 亡 1 = 丁.) 
We draw the model based on the following assumptions: 
1. During each round t assume the dropping probabilities of all 
coining packets of flow i are the same p{xi{t)). (They may 
not be the same in reality especially when the queue size is not 
large enough or in case of high throughput.) 
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2. All the coming packets during one round just come at t~ (Ac-
tually should be denoted as t p , the moment before the current 
round DRR scheduling starts. 
During the DRR algorithm, the queue length Xi will change as fol-
lows: 
dxi Min{Quantumi,Xi{t)) 
= Pt{t) • [1 — p{xi[t))\ — 1 工“t) (6.11) 
The first term is the rate of the queue length increase which is the 
incoming throughput pi{t) of flow i by the probability of dropping 
no packets in this round 1 — p{xi{t)), since we assume the identical 
dropping probability during each round. And the second term repre-
sents packets sending rate in bits/s during round t, where the length 
of this round is r^. And since in a busy router with DRR queues, 
traffic sent for each queue approximate Quantum in the long run, 
in our model, we skip the detail of deficit count accumulation be-
tween different rounds and use this general approximation instead. 
And the time length for each round Tt is just the sum of time 
sending a certain traffic of each queue. Thus, we have: 
Min{Quantumi, Xi{t)) n = ^ (0.12) 
where C is the capacity in bits/s of the busy router. 
TCP throughput adaption: For the TCP throughput adaption in 
DRR scheduling, the estimated round trip time of past TCP flows 
should be modified as follows: 
… � N. xAt) 
M t ) c八) (6.13) 
where a^  is the fixed propagation delay and N-Xi{t)/C approximates 
the queuing delay when N flows share the capacity C of the busy 
router. 
From our model of Droptail, it is easy to see that, the regula-
tions of TCP behavior under DRR scheduling are almost the same 
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as under Droptail scheduling except the behavior of queue length 
and calculation of RTT shown above. Thus, by combining these 
equations:(6.1),(6.11),(6.12),(6.3),(6.13),(6.6),(6.7), 
(6.9),(6.10), we come with the fluid model of TCP on a DRR router. 
Solving the group of differential equations, we will get the numeri-
cal description of the TCP behavior under the DRR scheduling. 
6.2 Simulation of TCP Fluid Model 
To test the effectiveness of the fluid model, we designed two groups 
of simulations: Attack with single TCP flow and attack with multiple 
TCP flows on both droptail router and DRR router. 
6.2.1 Simulation of Attack with Single TCP Flow 
The first group of simulation is described in Figure 6.1 and Fig-
ure 6.2. We designed a single TCP flow with a single low-rate at-
tack passing through the same congested router. The router may use 
droptail queues or DRR queues. The settings of simulation are the 
follows: The low-rate attack is a square burst with T — 1.1s，burst 
length I = 0.1s rate of burst R = SOOkb/s which contribute to the 
average throughput of less than 30kb/s. It will start 2s after the be-
ginning of the simulation. The capacity of the router is lOOkb/s all 
together. And we assume the propagation delay is 0.1s for the single 
TCP flow. Under the DRR scheduling, we set the quantum of each 
round Ikb and the buffer size approximates lOkb. 
- 八 D r o p t a i l Queue 
Attack 
Figure 6.1: Attack with single TCP flow on Droptail router 
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DRR Queues 
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Figure 6.2: Attack with single TCP flow on DRR router 
The results are shown in Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4. As depicted 
in Figure 6.3，on the droptail router, the TCP flow enjoys a full band-
width (around lOOkb/s) during the first two seconds before the at-
tack appears. While in case of the low-rate attack, TCP flow only 
obtains less than 20kb/s throughput and around 50% of the band-
width has not been used. 
3001 ,11 II ‘ II 111 
——Attack 
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Figure 6.3: Result of attack with single TCP flow on Droptail router 
And on the router which adopts DRR scheduling, TCP flow is 
protected from the low-rate attack. In Figure 6.4, the throughput of 
TCP flow only decreases a little at the moment of burst and TCP has 
never entered the silent timeout period. From the figure, we can see 
that the TCP flow obtains around 70% of the capacity on average 
during the attack. 
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Figure 6.4: Result of attack with single TCP flow on DRR router 
6.2.2 Simulation of Attack with Multiple TCP flows 
In the second group of simulations, we design three scenarios which 
focus on the effectiveness of different scheduling method to multiple 
TCP flows. First we arrange four unsynchronized TCP flows with 
one single low-rate attack passing through one congested router. The 
common settings of these simulations remain the same as before. 
Case 1: In the first case (Figure 6.5), all the four TCP flows share 
the same droptail queue with the low-rate attack in the router. The 
propagation delay for the unsynchronized TCP flows are 0.1s, 0.2s， 
0.45 and 0.8s each. 
The result is shown in Figure 6.6. Although the burst of attack 
is 300kb/s, we plot the figure with Y-axis from 0 to 100 for clear 
exhibition of four TCP flows,(and so do the next two plots of result). 
As we can see, before the attack, all four TCP flows share the ca-
pacity of the link proportional to their round trip time. TCPl with 
the minimum delay enjoys the largest throughput. In case of low-
rate attack, almost all the TCP flows are affected. The throughput 
of TCPl decreases sharply from around 80kb/s to around 20kb/s. 
TCPl is the most responsive due to the shortest latency and TCP4 
has been affected least due to its long propagation delay. On average 
CHAPTER 6. FLUID MODEL OF TCP FLOWS 65 
E k 
TCP2 
taa^MMM^ ^ V , ^ \ Droptail Queue 
广 ^ ^ \ M I M 
Attack Z 
Figure 6.5: Attack with multiple TCP flows on Droptail router 
there are 40% of capacity wasted. 
lOOl n n ~ r y , ~ ~ ,11  
——Attack 
I — T C P 1 
80 … T C P 2 • 
/ N TCP3 60 / 
1/ ...... j^ pfTrL.L.L. 一 ’ 
0 2 4 6 8 10 
Figure 6.6: Result of attack with multiple TCP flows on Droptail router 
Case 2: In the second scenario (Figure 6.7)，each of the four TCP 
flows and the low-rate attack is assigned to one DRR queue in the 
router and share the capacity of lOOkb/s together. The propagation 
delay for TCP flows are the same as the first case. 
From Figure 6.8, we can see that DRR has successfully isolated 
the attack traffic. None of the TCP flows have been affected by 
the attack. Another important discovery is that fairness is obtained 
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Figure 6.7: Attack with multiple TCP flows on DRR router 
among the five flows. As time goes by, the throughput of each TCP 
flow converges to around 20kb/s which is one fifth of the capacity. 
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Figure 6.8: Result of attack with multiple TCP flows on DRR router 
Case 3: We have designed another comprehensive scenario, as shown 
in Figure 6.10, three TCP flows come from one input interface of the 
router, and the other TCP flow comes from another input interface 
with the low-rate attack. Each interface possesses a DRR queue. 
The attack settings and router settings are the same as before. The 
propagation delay for the first three TCP flows are O.I5, 0.2s and 
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0.4s. TCP4 has a 0.1s propagation delay. 
TCP1 \ 
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Figure 6.9: Attack with multiple TCP flows on DRR router 
From the result (Figure 6.10), we can see that, DRR schedul-
ing provides excellent fair allocation of resource between different 
queues. The first three TCP flows have not suffered from the attack 
and they share more than half of the capacity proportional to their 
latencies. While the throughput of TCP4 degenerate a lot after the 
start of low-rate attack. So if we want to protect TCP4, defending 
mechanism need to be pushed back to upstream routers. 
1001 n~-T] ,11 M • II in 
——Attack 
— T C P 1 
80[ - - - T C P 2 . 
b . � . , TCP3 
- - T C P 4 ...• '-Tj • 
， — / \r" 
°0 2 4 6 8 10 
Figure 6.10: Result of attack with multiple TCP flows on DRR router 
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In this chapter, we carry out experiments using NS-2 to de-
termine the effectiveness of the proposed defense mecha-
nism.  
J ^ H ^ n . 
Router Server 
Attacker 
Figure 7.1: Single low-rate attack and single TCP flow. 
7.1 Experiment 1 (Single TCP flow vs. single source 
attack) 
The first experiment is depicted in Figure 7. We consider a single 
low-rate TCP attack and a single TCP flow going through the same 
router. The latency of each link is 5ms, with the minimum Round 
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Trip Time (RTT) being 20 ms. And the capacity of each link is 5 
Mbps. The low-rate attack is a square burst with T = 1.0 sec, burst 
length I = 0.2 sec, burst rate of 5 Mbps or R = 1. The low-rate 
attack uses UDP with packet size of 100 bytes. The packet size of 
the TCP flow is 500 bytes. Under the DRR, we set the quantum 
size of each round to be 500 bytes and the buffer size is 5000 bytes. 
The result is illustrated in Table 7.1 and Figure 7.1. Note that with-
out the defense mechanism, the router simply uses the conventional 
scheduling (e.g., drop tail or FCFS) to handle packets. And we ob-
serve that the TCP flow can only utilize around 4% of the link's 
bandwidth. On the other hand, when one uses the DRR, we ob-
serve an improvement in the TCP's throughput from 224.37 Kbps to 
3.402 Mbps, or an improvement from 4.49% to 68.04% of the link 
capacity. 
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Figure 7.2: Result for Low-rate Attack to Single TCP Flow using Tahoe, Reno 
and New Reno 
Table 7.2 and 7.3 depict the same performance when we use TCP 
Reno and new Reno. One may observe that it is not quite effec-
tive for TCP Reno, as the throughput can only be increased to less 
than 20% when DRR is adopted. This is due to the congestion con-
CHAPTER 7. EXPERIMENTS 71 
trol algorithm of TCP Reno which will have a performance prob-
lem when multiple packets are dropped from one transmission win-
dow. As mentioned in [18]，when TCP Reno incurs multiple packets 
drop, although it can retransmit the first lost packet after receiving 
three duplicated ACKs, it is unable to employ Fast Retransmit again 
and must instead await a retransmission timeout which will then put 
the sender into the Slow-Start phase. Therefore the DRR will not 
achieve a good performance for TCP Reno in case there are multi-
ple packets dropped. One possible solution is to increase the DRR 
buffer. As shown in Table 7.4，we repeat the experiment with differ-
ent sizes of DRR buffer while all other parameters remain the same. 
One can observe that the throughput gradually increased to about 
85% when the buffer is 30000 bytes. 
The result shows the effectiveness of the defense mechanism to 
protect the TCP flows from the ill-behaved attacking flow. 
— II TCP Attack flow 
throughput % of link throughput % of ca-
(Kbps) capacity (Kbps) pacity 
Drop tail —224.37 4.49% 1016.5 2 0 . 3 3 % ^ 
DRR 3402.10 68.04% 780.39 15.61% 
Table 7.1: Result for Low-rate Attack to Single TCP Flow using Tahoe. 
— TCP Attack flow — 
throughput % of link throughput % of ca-
(Kbps) capacity (Kbps) pacity 
Drop tail 26.30 0.53% 1022.55 20.45% 
DRR 946.87 18.94% 1014.97 2 0 . 3 0 % ^ 
Table 7.2: Result for Low-rate Attack to Single TCP Flow using Reno. 
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— TCP Attack flow 
throughput % of ca- throughput % of ca-
(Kbps) pacity (Kbps) pacity 
Drop tail 23.62 0.47% 1022.04 20.44% 
^ R R 3690.32 7 3 . 8 1 % ~ 913.39 18.27% 
Table 7.3: Result for Low-rate Attack to Single TCP Flow using New Reno. 
— II TCP Attack flow 
(Bytes) throughput % of link throughput % of ca-
(Kbps) capacity (Kbps) pacity 
5000 946.87 18.94% 1014.97 20.30% 
15000 —1786.92 T5.74% 1000.67 2 0 . 0 1 % ^ 
30000 一 4 2 8 6 . 6 8 "i5.73% 656.26 1 3 . 1 3 % ^ 
Table 7.4: Result for Reno TCP Flow with different DRR Buffer size. 
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Figure 7.3: Single low-rate attack and Multiple TCP flows. 
7.2 Experiment 2 (Multiple TCP flows vs. single 
source attack) 
The second experiment is depicted in Figure 7.3. We consider a sin-
gle low-rate TCP attack and 8 TCP flows going through the same 
router. Parameters are the same as Experiment 1 except that the 
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buffer size of the DRR-enabled router is 12.5 Kbytes. So the mini-
mum RTT remains the same as 20 ms while the upper bound ofRTT 
is increased to 25 ms. The result is illustrated in Table 7.5 and Fig-
ure 7.4. Again, using the conventional drop tail scheduling, the total 
TCP bandwidth is only around 8% of the link's bandwidth. When 
one uses the DRR, we can improve the throughput of all TCP flows 
from 423.92 Kbps to 4.390 Mbps, or an improvement from 8.48% 
to 87.80% of the link capacity. From Figure 7.4, it is easy to see 
that flow TCP 4 gains more average throughput than others on the 
drop tail router. The reason is that TCP 4 has not been completely 
synchronized by the low-rate attack, and can still transmit several 
packets during some silent periods between bursts. Table 7.6，7.7 
and Figure 7.5, 7.6 depict the same performance gain when we use 
TCP Reno and new Reno. This shows the effectiveness of the de-
fense mechanism. 
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Figure 7.4: Result for Single Low-rate Attack to Multiple TCP Flows using Tahoe. 
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— Drop Tail DRR 
throughput % of link throughput % of link 
(Kbps) capacity (Kbps) capacity 
Attack flow 938.51 18.77% 302.55 6.05% 
TCPl 26.15 0.52% T87.15 1T74% 
TCP 2 24.56 0.49% "482.56 
TCP 3 4.75 0.10% 484.14 ^ 6 8 % 
TCP 4 344.69 6.89% 634.70 1 2 . 6 9 % ^ 
TCP 5 ^ 0.13% 550.7 1 1 . 0 1 % ^ 
TCP 6 4J5 0.10% 593.49 11.87% 
TCP 7 7.13 0.14% 566.55 11.33% 一 
TCP 8 ^ 0.11% 490.48 ~9.81% 
Total TCP 423.92 8.48% 4389.77 87.80*!^ ^~ 
Table 7.5: Result for Single Low-rate Attack to Multiple TCP Flows using Tahoe. 
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Flow ID Figure 7.5: Result for Single Low-rate Attack to Multiple TCP Flows using Reno 
7.3 Experiment 3 (Multiple TCP flows vs. synchro-
nized distributed low-rate attack) 
The third experiment is depicted in Figure 7.7. We consider a dis-
tributed low-rate TCP attack and 8 TCP flows going through the 
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Drop Tail DRR 
throughput % of link throughput % of link 
(Kbps) capacity (Kbps) capacity 
Attack flow 948.34 1 8 . 9 7 % 4 4 1 . 3 0 8.83% 
TCPl 343.89 6.88% 449.28 8.99% 
TCP 2 22.19 0.44% 468.30 9.37% 
TCP 3 0.38% 574.48 11.49% 
TCP 4 i T ^ 0.35% 441.36 8.83% 
TCP 5 2 3 ^ 0.48% 616.47 12.33% 
TCP 6 20.60 0.41% 605.38 12.11% 
TCP 7 20.60 0.41% 492.86 9.86% 
TCP 8 r ^ 0.40% 506.33 ~10.13% 
Total TCP 487.31 9.75% || 4154.45 83.09% 
Table 7.6: Result for Single Low-rate Attack to Multiple TCP Flows Using Reno 
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Figure 7.6: Result for Single Low-rate Attack to Multiple TCP Flows using New 
Reno 
same router. Parameters are the same as Experiment 2 except we re-
place a single attacker by three distributed attackers. Each attacker 
CHAPTER 7. EXPERIMENTS 76 
— Drop Tail DRR 
throughput % of link throughput % of link 
(Kbps) capacity (Kbps) capacity 
Attack flow — 922.51 18.45 % 249.90 ToO % 
TCPl ^ 0.17% 527.73 10.55 % ~ 
TCP 2 T ^ 0.16% 520.59 10.41 % ~ 
TCP 3 7.13 "a i4% 524.56 10.49% 
TCP 4 ^ 0.13% 564.18 11.28 % 
TCP 5 ^ 0.13% 530.90 10.62 % ^ 
TCP 6 633.90 12.68 % 一 6 1 3 . 3 0 12.27 % 
TCP 7 T 7 5 0.10% 637.87 12 .76%~ 
TCP 8 T I 7 0.06 % ~ 645.00 ~ 12.90% “ 
Total TCP 678.28 13.57% 4564.11 91.28o%~ 
Table 7.7: Result for Single Low-rate Attack to Multiple TCP Flows Using New 
Reno 
TCP 81 
^ ^ / Router attacker 1 / W attacker 3 
Figure 7.7: Distributed low-rate attack and Multiple TCP flows. 
sends a periodic attack burst every T = 3.0 seconds. The at-
tacker sends a burst with R = 1 during the i认 sub-period so that 
the converged attack becomes a low-rate attack with period T = 1.0 
sec. The result is illustrated in Table 7.1 and Figure 7.8. One can 
observe that with DRR, we can improve the throughput of all TCP 
flows from 469.67 Kbps to 4.296 Mbps, or an improvement from 
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9.39% to 85.94% of the link capacity. Table 7.9，7.10 and Figure 
7.9，7.10 depict the result when we use TCP Reno and TCP new 
Reno respectively. Similar observation can be made and this shows 
the effectiveness of the defense mechanism. 
— Drop Tail DRR 
throughput % of link throughput % of link 
(Kbps) capacity (Kbps) capacity 
Attack 1 355.30 7.11% 120.98 2.42% 
Attack 2 — 305.91 “ 6.12% 116.34 2.33% 
Attack 3 309.63 6.19% 111.17 2.22% 
TCP 1 218.47 4.37% 818.58 1 6 . 3 7 % ^ 
TCP 2 0.33% 748.80 14.98% 
TCP 3 ~ 9.13 0.180/0 748.80 14.98% 
TCP 4 ^ 0.14% 489.54 9.79% 
TCP 5 — 6.44 0.13% 436.93 8.74% 
TCP 6 "203.97 4.08% 432.64 8.65% — 
TCP 7 ^ 0.11% 314.55 6.29% 
TCP 8 — 2.68 - 0.05% 307.03 6.14% 
Total attack 970.84 19.42% 348.49 6.97% 
Tota丨 TCP — 469.67 “ 9.39% 4296.87 85.94% 
Table 7.8: Result for Synchronized Distribute Low-rate Attack to Multiple TCP 
Flows using Tahoe. 
7.4 Experiment 4 (Network model of low-rate at-
tack vs. Multiple TCP flows) 
The fourth experiment is depicted in Figure 7.11. The transmission 
bandwidth of all links is 5 Mbps and the propagation delay is 5 ms. 
Thus, the minimum RTT for TCP1,TCP2 and the attacker is 50 ms 
and the RTT for TCP3 and TCP4 are 40 ms and 30 ms respectively. 
The attacker is located at router Ri and it sends a periodic attack 
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Figure 7.8: Result for Synchronized Distribute Low-rate Attack to Multiple TCP 
Flows using Tahoe .. 
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Figure 7.9: Result for Synchronized Distribute Low-rate Attack to Multiple TCP 
Flows using Reno 
with T = 1 sec, I = 0.2 sec and R = 1. There are four TCP flows, 
TCP 1 is attached to Ri, TCP 2 is attach to R3, TCP 3 is attached 
to Rs and the TCP 4 is attached to Rj. All of them try to upload 
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— Drop Tail DRR 
throughput % of link throughput % of link 
(Kbps) capacity (Kbps) capacity 
Attack 1 356.95 7.14% 175.48 3.51 % 
Attack 2 302.55 6.05 % 146.99 2.94 % 
Attack 3 TO5.65 TTl % 133.68 2.67 % 
TCP 1 — 256.04 5.12 % 559.32 11 .19%~ 
TCP 2 0.32 % 572.74 11.45 % ^ 
TCP 3 T.05 587.23 11.74% 
TCP 4 "6.98 "AI4% ~5L5M 10.32 % 
TCP 5 0.13% 489.54 9.79 % 
TCP 6 — 77.83 1.56% 383.26 "7.67 % 
TCP 7 3.76 0.08 % 446.60 8.93 % 
TCP 8 • — 126.14 2.52 % 409.56 8 . 1 9 % ^ 
Total attack 965.16 19.30% 456.15 9.12% 
Total TCP 501.35 10.03% 3964.08 7 9 . 2 8 % ^ 
Table 7.9: Result for Synchronized Distribute Low-rate Attack to Multiple TCP 
Flows Using Reno 
files to the server. Table 7.11 shows the throughput of attack and 
TCP flows when no defense mechanism is deployed (under the drop 
tail column), as well as the throughput of various flows when DRR 
is employed at different routing elements. The table shows that en-
abling the DRR at different routing elements will achieve different 
TCP throughput. In particular, when DRR is enabled in Rq only, 
the bandwidth of TCP 4 is approximately equal to the sum of band-
width of all upstream flows (e.g., TCP 1 to TCP 3 and the attack 
traffic). Under the proposed distributed defense mechanism, routers 
R]_, R2, Ra and Rq will discover the presence of low-rate attack and 
they will enable the DRR scheduling. One can observe fairness is 
achieved wherein all TCP flows will achieve approximately the same 
amount of bandwidth and they are protected and isolated from the 
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Drop Tail DRR 
throughput % of link throughput % of link 
(Kbps) capacity (Kbps) capacity 
Attack 1 354.84 7.10% ~124.65 2.49 % 
Attack 2 302.25 ~6.04 % To5.81 ~2A2% 
Attack 3 314.32 6.29 % 90.68 1.81 % 
TCPl 2 3 ^ 0.47 % 859.38 17.19 % ^ 
TCP 2 0.25 % 5 7 3 . 2 7 ~11.47% 
TCP 3 1 0 ^ 0.20 % 672.04 13.44% 
TCP 4 152.98 3 . 0 6 % 6 2 6 . 9 5 —12.54 % 
TCP 5 " ^ 5 8 1.19% 461.63 9.23 % — 
TCP 6 228.67 4.57 % 462.70 9.25 % 
TCP 7 — "lAS 0.04 % 440.15 8.80 % 
TCP 8 ^ ^ 0.06 % 385.94 7.72 % 
Total attack 971.41 19.43% 321.14 6.42% 
Total TCP 492.76 9.86 % 4482.06 8 9 . 6 4 % ^ 
Table 7.10: Result for Synchronized Distribute Low-rate Attack to Multiple TCP 
Flows Using New Reno 
ill-behaved attack flow. 
Lastly, we like to comment about the practicality of the proposed 
method. The purpose of our proposed methodology is to provide a 
practical solution for detecting and defending against the low-rate 
attack. Consider a victimized core router with 10 interface cards. 
Although the low-rate attack will converge to one interface card (in 
which the victim site is attached to that interface card), by perform-
ing our defending mechanism, at least 90% TCP flows to the victim 
site will be isolated from the attack traffic. Additionally, with the co-
operation of routers, the pushback mechanism [66] can successfully 
push the detection and protection as close to the source as possible. 
Thus more TCP flows will get protected. 
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Figure 7.10: Result for Synchronized Distribute Low-rate Attack to Multiple TCP 
Flows using New Reno 
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Figure 7.11: Network model of Low-rate attack and Multiple TCP flows . 
• End of chapter. 
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Drop tail DRR on DRR on DRR on DRR on 
Rq Re, R4 Re, RQ)丑4 
^ R2.R1 
throughput throughput throughput throughput throughput 
(kbps) (kbps) (kbps) (kbps) (kbps) 
Attack 640.00 561.00 453.00 419.00 404.00 
TCPl 386.00 358.00 311.00 314.00 778.00 
TCP 2 264.00 329.00 282.00 874.00 763.00 
TCP 3 324.00 251.00 1,245.00 924.00 788.00 
TCP 4 425.00 1,719.00 1,154.00 966.00 • 765.00 
Total TCP 1,399.00 2,657.00 2,992.00 3，078.00 3,094.00 





This chapter concludes the work we have done in this thesis. 
In this thesis, we present a distributed and efficient approach to 
dynamically detect and defend against low-rate TCP attacks. We 
present a formal model to describe a large family of low-rate TCP 
attack patterns, and then we propose a distributed detection mech-
anism which uses the dynamic time warping algorithm to compare 
the feature of the sampled input with the signature of the low-rate at-
tack. We show that the detection mechanism is robust and accurate 
in identifying the existence of low-rate attack. In particular, one can 
achieve very low false positive/negative when compare to legitimate 
Internet traffics. When the low-rate attack is present, we use a push 
back mechanism so as to identify the attack as close to the attack 
source as possible. The rationale of this push back is to minimize 
the number of affected TCP flows. We show that one can use the 
deficit round-robin (DRR) approach to protect the TCP flows and 
isolate them from the attack traffic. Fluid model of TCP are devel-
oped to precisely describe the behavior of TCP flows under DRR 
approach. Experiments are carried out to quantify the robustness 
and accuracy of the proposed detection. Extensive simulations are 
83 
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carried to quantify the merits and effectiveness of the proposed de-
fense mechanism. 
• End of chapter. 
Appendix A 
Lemmas and Theorem Derivation 
Summary 
Here are the proof of all the lemmas and theorem presented 
in Chapter 5. 
Note: The lemmas, theorem and their proof are derived based on 
the work in [56:. 
Lemma 1: For any class i, during the execution of DRR algorithm, 
the deficit_counter[i] is bounded below by 0 and bounded above 
by Max, where Max is the maximum packet size of all possible 
packets. Formally, we have 
0 < deficit_counter[i] < Max. 
Proof: At the beginning of the algorithm, we set deficit_counter[i]= 
0, which is obviously less than Max. At the end of the service round 
of class i, we need to consider two cases: 
85 
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1. If there is a packet left in the queue of class i, then its size is 
greater than deficit_counter[i]. Since the size of any packet 
is no more than Max, we have deficit_counter[i] < Max and 
deficit_counter[i] > 0. 
2. If the queue of class i is empty, then deficit_counter[i] is reset 
to zero. I 
Lemma 2: During any period in which class i is backlogged’ the 
number of bytes sent on the behalf on class i is hounded by 
m • Quantum[i] - Max < senti{ti,t<2) < m . Quantum[i] + Max 
where m is the number of round-robin service opportunities received 
by class i during this interval. 
Proof : Let use use the term “round” to denote service opportuni-
ties received by class i within an interval ( 亡 i , 力 2 ) . We number these 
rounds from 1 to round m. With loss of generality, we treat ti, the 
start of an interval, as the end of round 0. Define deficit_counter[i] [k 
as the value of deficit_counter[i] at the end of round k. We also de-
fine bytesi{k) as the bytes sent by class i in round k and senti{k) 
be the bytes sent by class i from round 1 through k. We have 
sent丄k) = bytesi{k). 
It is easily observed that 6^teSj(/c)+deficit_counter[i] [k] = Quantum[i]+ 
deficit_counter[i][k — 1]. As in round k, the accumulated allocation 
to class i is Quantum[i]+cleficit_counter[i][k — 1]. Therefore, if class 
i sends bytesi{k), then the reminder will be stored in deficit_counter[i][k:. 
Since the queue for class i never empties during the interval (力 1,亡2), 
we will have: 
bytes i(k) =Quantum[i] + 
deficit—counter[i][k — 1] — deficit_counter[i][k . 
Summing this over all m rounds of servicing of class i, and because 
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senti(k) = bytesi{k), we have 
senti[m) —m ‘ Quantum[i]+ 
deficit_counter[i][0] — deficit_counter[i][m . 
Then the result follows because deficit_counter[i] is always non_negative 
and upper bounded by Max (by Lemma 1). • 
Theorem 1: Under the DRR service discipline, for an interval (ti，亡2), 
we have the following fairness measure: 
F M i f u h ) < 2 . Max + Quantum, 
where Quantum = Mm(Quantum[i ] ) . 
Proof : Consider an interval ( 力 i ， 力 2 ) under the DRR algorithm and 
any two class i and j that are backlogged in this interval. As each 
class is serviced in a strict round-robin mode, therefore, if we let 
m be the number of the round-robin opportunities given to class i 
in the interval (力 1，力2), and we let m' be the number of round-robin 
opportunities given to class j in the same interval, then we have 
m — m'\ < 1. From Lemma 2 we get: 
senti(ti,t2) < m . Quantum[i] + Max. 
Based on the definition, Q, the share given to any class i, is equal to 
Quantum[i]/Quantum. Therefore the normalized service received 
by class i is 
senti{ti^t2)/ci < m • Quantum + Max/ci. 
Similarly, for class j, we can obtain: 
sentj{ti, t^) > m! • Quantum[j] — Max 
= m ! . Quantum|j] — Max 
and 
sentj{ti,t2)/cj > m'. Quantum[j] — Max/cj. 
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Subtracting the equations for the normalized service for class i and 
j, and using the fact that m - m' < 1, we get 
sentAti. ^2) sentj(tiA2) 八 Max Max — < Quantum H 1  
Ci Cj Ci Cj 
As both Ci and Cj are greater than 1，the theorem follows. • 
• End of chapter. 
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